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1. Introduction: banking and payment institutions in the Medieval Islamic world 
 
 By the middle of the eighth century CE the Arabs established their dominion from 
the Atlantic Ocean to west of the Persian Gulf. In the process, they spread Islam and 
established Islamic law1 as the law of the land throughout this entire vast territory. Until 
the rise of the Turkish Ottoman Empire between the 13th the 16th centuries CE, that 
territory included North Africa (both Egypt and the Maghreb), Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, 
Syria, Iraq and Arabia.2  
 
The era of the pre-Ottoman Arab domination of those lands roughly coincides 
with the Middle Ages.3 During that time, centres of economic and financial activity were 
located in the Near East in the land between the rivers Tigris and Euphrates as well as 
along the river Nile; this respectively coincides with modern-day Iraq and Egypt.4 It was 
observed that the business practices and instruments that had developed throughout those 
lands during that period heralded the bill of exchange, both as a mechanism for the 
                                                 
1 The Islamic legal system is traced by the classical theory to four sources: “the Koran, 
the sunna of the Prophet, that is, his model behavior, the consensus of the orthodox 
community, and the method of analogy.” See J. Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan 
Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950, rep. 1959) at 1. For the evolution of the 
Islamic legal system see in general e.g. NJ Coulson, A History of Islamic Law 
(Edinburgh: University Press, 1964.). But for possible influence of local laws that existed 
in the newly acquired territories, see e.g. P. Crone, Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law 
(Cambridge: Cambrdige University Press, 1987) at 92-93 and Appendix 2 at 102 where a 
view (attributed to Goldziher) on the strong influence of Roman law on Islamic 
jurisprudence is cited and documented. Byzantine influence is discussed by J. Schacht, 
“Droit byzantin et droit musulman”, in Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Convegno di 
Scienze Morali Storiche e Filologiche: Oriente ed Occidente nel Medio Evo (Roma: 
Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1957) at 197.  
 
2 For a historic outline (including a map) visit 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam#Rise_of_empire_.28632.E2.80.93750.29>. Website 
sources are indicated only for information that is common knowledge. For Islamic law as 
the civil law of the Ottoman Empire, see the beginning of §2.3 below. 
 
3 The Middle Ages are commonly dated from the 5th century fall of the Western Roman 
Empire until the fall of the Eastern Roman Empire in the 15th century. Visit 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_Ages>. 
 
4 The former was the centre of the Abbasid Caliphate (between the middle of the 8th and 
the 13th century CE) while the latter was the centre of the Fatimid Caliphate (between the 




transmission of funds and as a negotiable instrument.5 These Islamic instruments,6 the 
law that governs them, and hence the grounds of the aforesaid thesis are the focus of this 
paper.     
 
At first blush, identifying the Islamic lands as the ‘cradle of negotiability’7 is 
counter-intuitive. Thus, banking is premised on lending for profit out of bank deposits; in 
turn, deposit-taking is bound to flourish where the deposit-taker remunerates depositors, 
namely, pays interest on deposits. It is against the background of a thriving banking 
system that one expects the development of any non-cash payment system8 as well as 
instruments designed for its operation. Islamic law prohibits the taking of interest on 
loans and thus does not provide for adequate legal infrastructure for banking to develop. 
Not surprisingly, in the Medieval Islamic world, ‘banks’ in the full sense of the word did 
not exist.9  
 
And yet, the Medieval Islamic world had monetary economy which nevertheless 
required banking services. Those came to be provided by private money changers, called 
sarrafs, and official money changers and assayers, called jahbads.10 It is in the context of 
                                                 
5 P. Huvelin, “Travaux récents sur l’histoire de la lettre de change” (1901), 15(1) Annales 
de droit francais , étranger et international 1, at 21-26, arguing at 25 that “the Arab 
influence is certain.” (hereafter: Huvelin, Travaux). 
 
6 Throughout this Paper, ‘instrument’ and ‘document’ are usually used interchangeably. 
 
7 The expression is mine; it purports to rephrase the observation indicated in text & note 5 
above. “Negotiability” is used here to denote the sum of the features of a “negotiable 
instrument”; briefly stated, these are transferability by delivery so as possibly to give a 
complete title to the instruments and the rights therein. See text & note 127, below.   
 
8  For the link among these three activities, namely, deposit-taking, lending and the 
provision of payment services as underlying the origin of banking in Ancient Greece, see 
R. Bogaert, Les Origines antiques de la banque de dépôt  (Leyde: A. W. Sijthoff, 1966) 
at at 137 -144 (hereafter: Bogaert, Les Origines). To these days, “To be recognized as a 
bank … an institution is expected to receive deposits of money from its customers; to 
maintain current accounts for them; to provide advances in the form of loans or 
overdrafts; and to manage payments on behalf of its customers …” See e.g. E. Green, 
Banking — An Illustrated History (New York: Rizzoli International Publications, Inc., 
1989) at 11. 
 
9 AL Udovitch, “Bankers without Banks: Commerce, Banking, and Society in the Islamic 
World of the Middle Ages”, in Centre for Medieval and Renaissance Studies University 
of California, Los Angles  (ed.) The Dawn of Modern Banking (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1979) at 255, 258-259 (Hereafter: Udovitch, Bankers). 
 
10 For an overview, see e.g. SM Imamuddin, “Bayt Al-Mal and Banks in the Medieval 
Muslim World” (1960), 34 Islamic Culture 22 at 27-30.  For both categories as 
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banking services provided by these actors that both new instruments and novel legal 
doctrine emerged. 
 
Particularly noteworthy is the banking activity of the jahbad,11 who was both a 
large merchant, as well as an expert in all monetary matters, and for whom the provision 
of banking services was thus an incidental business activity.12 As a banker, a jahbad 
could act in a formal capacity for the state and royal court; to that end, such a jahbad held 
a title which he kept for his lifetime and which was passable to an heir of his. Jahbads 
tended to act in close networks that invoked trust so as to facilitate long-distance 
monetary transactions, and yet stifled competition by precluding newcomers’ entry to the 
profession.  
 
Other than assaying, setting official rate of exchange for coins, and money 
changing, the banking activities of the jahbads were deposit taking, advancing funds to 
the authorities, and remitting funds. All three look like normal activities forming banking; 
and yet, they bore significant variations. 
 
Thus, deposit taking was not carried out by way of borrowing from depositors and 
accumulating of funds to be lent. Rather, other than in conjunction with the remittance of 
funds as set out below, deposit taking was for safe keeping, pure and simple. Much of it 
was not even properly recorded as it was a means to hide wealth with trusted persons 
such as jahbads. There is however some controversy as to whether such deposits were 
profitably used by the jahbad,13 and if so, it is not clear on what basis profit and loss 
were allocated. The supply of funds to public authorities was a major profitable activity 
of the jahbad; it was however carried out mainly not by regular lending but rather in 
                                                                                                                                                 
successors of the Byzantine trapezitai of Greco-Roman Egypt, see Bogaert, Les Origines, 
above note 8 at 163. 
 
11 For an extensive discussion, on which much of the ensuing paragraphs build, see WJ 
Fischel, Jews in the Economic and Political Life of Medieval Islam (London: Royal 
Asiatic Society for Great Britain and Ireland, 1937) at 2 (hereafter: Fischel, Jews). An 
earlier partial version of the relevant discussion is W. Fischel, “The Origins of Banking in 
Mediaeval Islam: A contribution to the economic history of the Jews of Baghdad in the 
tenth century” 1933 The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 339. See also CC Torrey, 
“The Evolution of a Financier in the Ancient Near East” (1943), 2 Journal of Near 
Eastern Studies, 295. 
 
12 It is in this sense that Udovitch, Bankers above note 9 at 265-268 refers to the jahbad’s 
sphere of activity as “merchant banking”.  
 
 
13 Thus, Fischel speculates that “In all probability” amounts deposited with the jahbads 
“were made productive”.  Fischel, Jews above note 11 at 26. Conversely, Udovitch, 
Bankers above note 9 at 260, is of the view that deposits kept by a jahbad “could not be 
used as a form of productive investment.” 
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conjunction with tax farming, that is, by way of making advance payments on account of 
future or deferred tax collections, of which a portion of revenue was kept by the jahbad 
as profit.14
 
Remittance of funds bore the closest resemblance to a normal banking activity. It 
was made both in the form of delivery of purses and non-cash payments. Delivery of 
purses containing specie of coins was a unique and unusual banking activity; it certainly 
indicates lack of developed banking services. Non-cash payments were both local and 
from place to place; their mechanisms and governing legal principles is the subject of the 
present paper. At the outset I should however mention that while this activity gave rise to 
new types of documents, it did not seem to generate standard forms and procedures; 
certainly it did not give rise to interbank multilateral mechanisms for clearing and 
settlement. Moreover, in terms of scope, it may not have been significant in the context of 
the entire economy.15 Indeed, the modest scope of the activity reflected the restricted 
nature of banking during that era. At the same time, the instruments the remittance of 
funds activity generated were novel, which required the legal framework that governed 
them to break new grounds; this activity may have thus heralded the bill of exchange, and 
enhanced the emergence of the negotiable instrument so as to constitute an important link 
in the legal history of the order to pay money. The significance of the remittance of funds 
activity in the Medieval Islamic era was more qualitative than quantitative. 
 
Some form of deposit taking facilitating non-cash payments was practiced in local 
markets by the sarrafs, the private money changers. Small retailers operating in those 
markets opened accounts with the sarrafs. The retailers deposited funds in those accounts 
on which they drew and made non-cash payments to their wholesalers.16 In conjunction 
                                                 
14 Certainly, this profit must have been treated as a legitimate remuneration for his tax 
collection work rather than an illicit interest on the advances he made on the tax to be 
collected. 
 
15 Indeed, major works dedicated to the economic, financial and monetary system of the 
Medieval Near East do not mention the payment instruments, even in passing. See e.g. H. 
Rabie, The Financial System of Egypt: A.H. 564-741/A.D. 1169-1341 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1972) and AS Ehrenkreutz, “Monetary Aspects of Medieval Near 
Eastern Economic History” in MA Cook, Studies in the Economic History of the Middle 
East from the rise of Islam to the present day (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970; 
rep. 1978) at 37. To a similar effect in the period that preceded the Ottoman conquest, see 
D. Ayalon, “The System of Payment in Mamluk Military Society” (1958), 1 Journal of 
Economic and Social History of the Orient 37. 
 
16 See M. Talbi, “Opérations bancaires en Ifrīqiya à l’époque d’al-Māzarī (453-536/1061-
1141) – crédit et paiement par chèque”, in Études d’Histoire Ifriqiyenne et de Civilisation 
Musulmane Médiévale (Tunis: Publications de l’Université de Tunis: 1982) at 420. See 
also M. Gill, In the Kingdom of Ishmael (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1997) Volume I: 
Studies in Jewish History in Islamic Lands in the Early Middle Ages, at 497 [in Hebrew] 
who speaks of the use of the deposit document to make payments to the suppliers. 
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with such deposit accounts the sarrafs gave overdraft facilities to the retailers/account 
holders. Not having funds at hand, either in cash or in the form of credit to the account, 
the small retailers could thus nevertheless pay their suppliers by overdrawing the deposit 
accounts kept with the sarrafs. In compliance with the prohibition to charge interest, 
overdraft facilities were given by the sarrafs free of charge. The sarrafs profited from the 
scheme by taking advantage of the prevailing bi-metallic currency system; they thus 
credited in gold dinars deposits made by the retailers to the accounts in silver dirhems, 
using for the conversion (from silver to gold) a lower exchange rate than the going one.17 
In honouring payment orders drawn on the accounts, the sarrafs thus provided chequing 
services to their account holders.18     
 
Having set out briefly in this section the institutional framework, this paper 
proceeds to discuss in Section 2 the hawale, as the legal doctrine underlying the transfer 
of debts under the various schools of Islamic law. Subsequently, Section 3 analyses the 
Medieval Islamic payment instruments, and their operation in the context of hawale 
principles. The discussion covers the ruq’a and sakk, which were particularly used for 
local payments, as well as the suftaj, which facilitated the remittance of funds in the form 
of non-cash payments from place to place. Section 4 concludes by assessing the role and 
place of these instruments and the legal framework in which they operated as forerunners 
for the bill of exchange as a payment mechanism and negotiable instrument. 
 
The major contribution of the present discussion is threefold. First, it contains an 
in-depth analysis of the hawale under the various Islamic schools of law. Among them, 
two major schools are the Hanafi and Maliki.  The treatment of the hawale in the Mejelle, 
a nineteenth century codification or restatement of Hanafi civil law, is also part of the 
analysis, designed to provide a measure of verification to the conclusions reached on the 
Hanafi rules. Second, the present discussion highlights the nature of the hawale as a legal 
doctrine covering the Islamic payment instruments. It does not treat the hawale as a 
‘financial technique’ or type of a payment instrument, side-by-side with others.  Stated 
otherwise, the discussion presents the view that it is inaccurate to speak of the hawale and 
suftaj as two types of financial techniques or instruments.19  Rather, the former is the 
legal doctrine or set of rules covering the operation of the latter as a financial technique 
or payment instrument. Third, the discussion concludes by pointing out at the Maliki 
rules of the hawale as having, in their treatment of Medieval Islamic payment 
instruments, a modest and yet distinct role in the overall evolution ultimately facilitating 
negotiability as well as a major feature of the bill of exchange.    
 
                                                 
17  Talbi, ibid.   
 
18 Quare whether funds in each account were kept separately or whether they were 
mingled. Regardless, I could not find in Islamic legal doctrine anything similar to the 
Roman irregular deposit.  
 
19 As claimed by Udovitch, Bankers above note 9 at 263. See further, note 120 below, and 
text around it. 
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2. Transfer of debt under Islamic law: the hawale 
 
§2.1 The Mandate for collection and the hawale concept 
 
In the footsteps of earlier legal systems,20 Islamic law has treated a debt or the 
claim to the money owed thereon as an abstract right, and as such, not as an object or 
item of property which the creditor could dispose of by transfer or otherwise.21 However, 
over the years, bypassing strict orthodoxy, a few mechanisms have developed to confer 
on a debt the quality of a transferable item of property.22
 
The mandate for collection has played a principal role in that transformation. In 
this context, a creditor nominates the designated assignee,23 typically his own creditor, as 
his mandatary, conferring on him the authority to collect a debt owed to the creditor by 
the creditor’s own debtor. To achieve best results, the mandate to collect is to be 
reinforced by giving the ‘mandatary’-assignee the additional authority to sue a defaulting 
account debtor. The mandate is to be further strengthened by the inclusion therein of an 
express term under which the mandator waives the right of revocation. Vis-à-vis the 
mandatary-assignee, the mandator-creditor may also waive the benefit of the debt to be 
collected by renouncing his claim to proceeds to be collected.24 Such a claim to the 
                                                 
20  For Roman law, see e.g.. R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations-Roman 
Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Cape Town: Juta, 1990) at 58-59. For Jewish law 
see S. Albeck, “The Assignment of Debt in the Talmud” (1957), 26 Tarbiz 262 [in 
Hebrew]. 
 
21 J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964, rep. 1998) 
at 134 (hereafter: “Schacht, Introduction”); and C. Chehata, Essai d’une théorie générale 
de l’obligation en droit musulman (Paris: Dalloz, 2005) at 97 [being an imprint of the 
author’s thesis defended in Cairo in 1936 and originally published in France under the 
title   Essai d’une théorie générale de l’obligation en droit musulman hanéfite (Paris: 
Éditions sirey, 1969)].  
 
22 The ensuing two paragraphs draw on E. Tyan, “Cession de dette et cession de créance 
dans la théorie et la practique du droit musluman (d’après le madhab hanafite)” (1946), 2 
Annales de l’école française de droit de Beyrouth no 3-4, 23 at 25-27 (hereafter: Tyan, 
Cession).  
 
23 Certainly, the mandatary, beneficiary of the transaction, is referred here as an ‘assignee’ 
(and the transaction as an ‘assignment’) by reference to the practical implication of the 
arrangement, and not its formal legal characterization.  
 
24 See e.g. Constantine Emilianides v. Aristodemo Sophocli (1910) 9 Cypr. LR 115, at  
116, dealing (against the background of the Mejelle further discussed in §2.3 below) with 




proceeds may anyway be lost to the mandator-assignor and accrue for the benefit of the 
mandatary-assignee to whom he owes by means of the operation of the right of setoff.25
 
Alternatively, a creditor may effectively waive his claim to a debt and confer it on 
a designated beneficiary, typically his own creditor, by ‘acknowledging’ that the debtor’s 
debt is actually owed to that assignee.26 Such an ‘acknowledgement’ bestows on the 
designated beneficiary the power to receive payment from the account debtor and give 
him a discharge. To allow the beneficiary to sue directly the creditor’s debtor, the original 
creditor must however give him a specific power of attorney, which is treated as 
irrevocable.   
 
  Each such method could be used as a payment mechanism under which the 
creditor wishes to pay a debt he owes to the beneficiary-assignee by means of directing 
his own (creditor’s) debtor, to be identified as the account debtor, to pay the beneficiary-
assignee. In such a case, the creditor-assignor is the debtor in the payment mechanism, 
his own debtor (the account debtor) is the paymaster, and the beneficiary-assignee is the 
creditor. The efficacy of each such method has been premised on the power of a creditor 
[the debtor in the payment mechanism] to effectively confer on the beneficiary-assignee 
[the creditor in the payment mechanism] the right to the proceeds of a debt. The debt is 
owed to the creditor [the debtor in the payment mechanism] by the account debtor [the 
paymaster in the payment mechanism]; once its proceeds have been collected, they pass 
to the beneficiary-assignee [the creditor in the payment mechanism].  
 
In theory however, it is neither the right to claim the debt, nor even to the money 
to be collected thereunder that has been transferred. Rather, by means of his contract with 
the assignee [creditor], the automatic operation of set-off, or his own ‘acknowledgement’, 
the assignor [debtor] disabled or precluded himself from claiming the proceeds paid by 
the account debtor [paymaster] to the assignee [creditor]; the proceeds could thus be kept 
by the assignee [creditor] in satisfaction of the assignor [debtor]’s debt to him. 
Effectively however, each such method operates in the same way of an assignment to the 
beneficiary-assignee [the creditor in the payment mechanism] of the debt owed by the 
account debtor [paymaster] to the assignor [the debtor in the payment mechanism]; it thus 
does not require the consent of the account debtor [paymaster].  
 
Beside such methods, Islamic law developed the hawale as a mechanism under 
which a debtor was able to shift his own obligation to pay his debt to another person. 
Thus, under Islamic law, the obligation to pay money owed, namely the indebtedness, has 
been considered as conferring a quality attached to, or bestowed on, the person of the 
debtor. Under specified conditions, it is however within the debtor’s power to pass on this 
quality to another person, who is to replace him and become a new debtor to the 
creditor.27 The one thus becoming a new debtor may have already been a debtor to 
                                                 
25  For the operation of setoff in general, see Chehata, above note 21 at 90-92. 
 
26 This is quite analogous to the Talmudic Oditta. See Talmudic Encyclopedia, Vol. 1 
(Jerusalem: Yad Harav Herzog, 1955) [in Hebrew] at 116. 
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another creditor; for him, the mechanism brings a new creditor. To that end, as explained 
below, stretching but staying within limits prescribed by Islamic doctrine, the hawale has 
developed to effect not only a change of a debtor to a creditor, but also a change of a 
creditor to a debtor. 
 
§2.2 The hawale in legal doctrine 
 
Hawale literally means ‘removal’28 or ‘turn’. It denotes the transference of an 
obligation from one person to another, constituted by “an agreement by which a debtor is 
freed from a debt by another becoming responsible for it.”29 What is transferred from the 
debtor to another person is an obligation to pay the debt; the hawale is thus 
distinguishable from the cession, which is the transfer from the creditor to another   
person of the right to the money owed or payment due on a debt.30 Strictly speaking, to 
avoid a terminological confusion, it may thus be better to speak of the hawale as covering 
the transference of an obligation rather than of a debt; the latter is ambiguous and may be 
taken to mean as relating to either the obligation to pay the debt or the money owed on 
the debt.  
 
In a hawale facilitating a payment mechanism, it is the paymaster (‘transferee’) 
who substitutes the debtor (‘transferor’), and takes over the debt owed by the latter to the 
creditor. In a practical setting, a paymaster-transferee who owes money to the original 
debtor-transferor expects not only that his payment to the creditor will confer a discharge 
on the original debtor-transferor towards the creditor but that in the process he (the 
paymaster-transferee) will also obtain his own discharge towards the original debtor-
                                                                                                                                                 
27 A point highlighted by Tyan, Cession, above note 22 at 24. 
 
28 This is the preferred word used by The Hedya or Guide: Commentary on the 
Mussulman Laws, translated, by order of the Governor-General and Council of Bengal. 
By C. Hamilton, 2nd ed. with preface and index, by SG Grady (Lahore: New Book House, 
1957) at 330. “The Hedya or ‘guide’.., consists of extracts from the most approved works 
of the early writers of Mohammadan Law, and was composed in the later half of the 12th 
century.” See Louka v. Nichola, (1901), 5 Cypr. L.R,  82 at 86, quoted by CA Hooper, 
The Civil Law of Palestine and Trans-Jordan, Volume II (Jerusalem, Azriel Press, 1936) 
at 24. 
 
29 For this definition see HAR Gibb and JH Kramers, Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam 
(Leiden: EJ Brill; London: Luzac, 1953) at 137 where it is further stated that the 
transference of the obligation “is the angle around which this legal mechanism ‘turns’.”  
The word further denotes the document by which the transference of the obligation is 
completed. Ibid. Particularly for other meanings see also B. Lewis, VL Ménage, Ch. 
Pellat and J. Schacht, The Encyclopaedia of Islam New Edition Volume III (Leiden: EJ 
Brill; London: Luzac, 1971) at 283-285. 
 
30 For cessio in Roman law, see A. Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law 
(Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1953) at 387.  
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transferor. A paymaster-transferee who does not owe money to the original debtor-
transferor intends either to extend credit to him or to give him a discharge from the 
creditor by way of gift. 
 
As a matter of an Islamic doctrine, the hawale is founded on the Prophet’s 
injunction regarding a creditor’s assent and claim against a solvent person to whom the 
original debtor transferred the debt. The injunction itself is however vague and open-
ended.31 Its full implications are explored by the four principal Islamic legal traditions 
which make the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali schools of law.32  
 
Among these schools of law there is a disagreement33 as to the legal theory 
underlying the hawale. Hence, some of its consequences are subject to controversies 
                                                 
31 Even translations are inconclusive if not altogether confusing. Thus, the Hedya, above 
note 28 at 332 quotes the Prophet to say that “Whenever a person transfers his debt upon 
a rich man, and the creditor assents to the same, then let the claim be made upon the rich 
man.” At the same time, according to the French translation and interpretation offered by 
Chéron and  Fahmy Bey,  in this saying, the Prophet is to be understood to command the 
creditor to accept the new solvent debtor offered to him.  See A. Chéron and MS  Fahmy 
Bey, “Le transport de dette dans les législations européennes et en droit musulman” IIe 
partie, “Le transport de dette (hewala) en droit musulman” (1931), 22 L’Égypte 
contemporaine 137, at 139 and 148-149. 
 
32 These schools are discussed by Schacht, Introduction, above note 21 at 57-68. See also 
Coulson, above note 1 at 86-102. For a succinct account see Hooper, above note 28 
Volume II at 14-16. All such schools originated mostly in the course of the second 
century of Islam. Among them, the Hanafi school has been prominent in the east, 
particularly in Iraq and Syria, while the Maliki school has been prominent in the west, 
particularly in Egypt and North Africa. See Schacht, ibid. at 65. The two original schools 
were the Hanafi and Maliki; the founder of the Shafi’i school was a pupil of the founder 
of the Maliki school, while the founder of the Hanbali school was a pupil of the founder 
of the Shafi’i school. The Maliki school makes heavy use of the prophetic hadiths 
(sayings of the Prophet). The Shafi'i school purports to be a synthesis of the Hanafi and 
Maliki systems but with greater stress on analogy. The Hanbali school is the stricter 
among all schools; it rejects analogy, consensus and judicial opinion as sources. For an 
overview, visit <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/med/goldschmidt.html> and 
<http://www.shunya.net/Text/Islam/IslamicRef.htm>. 
 For the origins of Islamic jurisprudence prior to the emergence of these schools, see H. 
Motzki, The Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence: Meccan Fiqh before the Classical Schools 
(trans. by MH Katz) (Leiden-Boston-Köln: Brill, 2002).  
 
33 Disagreement is not only among the various schools but on various points also internal 
to each of them. The ensuing discussion will focus on the salient lines of disagreement 
among the dominant theories of the four schools.  
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which bear practical implications.34  Disputed matters relate both to the creation and the 
range of consequences of the hawale. Particularly, there is no consensus as to the identity 
of the parties to the agreement establishing the hawale; and while it is clearly stated that 
as a result of the hawale the paymaster-transferee becomes liable to the creditor to pay 
the amount due to the creditor by the original debtor-transferor, it is not immediately 
clear whether the original debtor is thereby automatically discharged altogether towards 
the creditor. Furthermore, it is not all that obvious whether the paymaster-transferee’s 
liability to the creditor, resulting from the hawela, is on his own obligation to the original 
debtor-transferor (where such obligation exists), or whether it is on the obligation owed 
by the original debtor-transferor to the creditor. Certainly however, it is not an ‘abstract’ 
new obligation to pay to the creditor the sum owed to him; that is, the paymaster’s 
obligation is not divorced from the transaction that gave rise to either the debt originally 
owed by the paymaster-transferee (to the original debtor-transferor) or to the debt 
originally owed to the creditor (by the original debtor-transferor).35  
 
Specifically disputed are the answers to the following five questions: 
 
1. Who are the parties to the agreement under which a binding hawale is 
established?  
 
2. Must the transferee (paymaster), who is to assume vis-à-vis the creditor the debt 
owed by the transferor (original debtor), have been indebted to the transferor 
(original debtor)? 
 
                                                 
34 The ensuing discussion largely draws and develops on ND Ray, “The Medieval Islamic 
System of Credit and Banking: Legal and Historical Considerations” (1997), 12 Arab LQ 
43, 60-65. For a comprehensive discussion, equally relied on in the analysis that follows, 
see article by Chéron and Fahmy Bey, above note 31. The latter but not the former work 
covers also the Mejelle (discussed below in §2.3). See also Chehata, above note 21 at 99-
102, LWC van den Berg, Principes du droit musulman selon les rites d’ Abou Hanîfah et 
de  Châfi’î (trans. by R. de France de Tersant) (Alger: Typographie Adolphe Jourdan 
1896) at 100-101. Translated primary sources relied on are the Hedya, above note 28 at 
332-334 ; Khalîl ben Ish’âq, Abrégé de la loi musulmane selon le rite de’l Imâm Mâlek, 
Volume III: Le patrimoine (trans. by GH Bousquet) (Alger: La maison des livres, 1961) 
at 69; Imam Malik ibn Anas, Al-Muwatta of Imam Malik ibn Anas: The First Formulation 
of Islamic Law (trans. by A. Abdurrahman Bewley) (London and New York: Kegan Paul 
International, 1989) at 309 (§36.31); GH Bousquet, traduction francais annotée, Kitâb et-
Tanbîh ou Le livre de l’admonition touchant la loi musulmane selon le rite de l’Imâm 
Ech-Châfé‘î Volume II opérations sur patrimoine (Alger: la maison des livres, 1951) at 
34-35 (hereafter: Bousquet, Kitâb); and H. Laoust, Le Précis de droit d’Ibn Qudāma 
(jurisconsulte musulman d’école hanbalite né à Jérusalem en 541/1146, mort à Damas en 
620/1223) (Beyrouth: Institut Français de Damas, 1950) at 104. 
 
35 A point indicated by van den Berg, ibid. at 101.  
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3. Is recourse against the transferor (original debtor) available to the creditor upon 
the default of the transferee (the paymaster, namely, the new or replacing debtor)? 
 
4. What defences are available to the hawale transferee (the paymaster) sued by the 
creditor? 
 
5. What securities are available to the creditor enforcing his claim against the 
paymaster-transferee? 
 
The principal dividing line is between the Hanafi school and all three others. 
Thus, in Hanafi law, the hawale is classified as a contract of surety or guarantee, under 
which the security of the transferee (paymaster)’s obligation is conferred on the creditor 
owed by the transferor (the original debtor).36 Conversely, the other three schools classify 
the hawale primarily37 as a sale or exchange in which from the creditor’s point of view 
one debt extinguishes and is replaced by another. 
 
This distinction underlies most differences in the answer to the abovementioned 
questions:38
 
1. Who are the parties to the hawale agreement? 
 
■ According to Hanafi law, the hawale is established by the agreement of the 
creditor and transferee (paymaster). Indeed, since “mankind [is] of different 
dispositions with respect to the payment of debts,” the creditor must consent 
to the replacement of his debtor. The consent of the paymaster-transferee is 
also required “because by the contract of the transfer an obligation of debt is 
imposed upon him.”39  At the same time, neither the agreement nor the 
consent of the transferor (original debtor) is required. His agreement or 
consent is dispensed with since the paymaster-transferee’s engagement is 
perceived as exclusively made to the benefit of the original debtor-transferor 
so that it in no way adversely affects him.40 Nonetheless, a paymaster may not 
                                                 
36 The Hedya, above note 28 at 332. 
 
37 One important qualification is the formal adherence of the Hanbali school to the Hanafi 
guarantee view (See Chéron and Fahmy Bey, above note 31 at 140) and yet in line with 
the two other schools, to all the practical implications of the sale or exchange theory.   
 
38 Granted, though, that some solutions are pragmatic and vary from school to school, not 
according to any prevailing underlying philosophy. 
 
39 The Hedya, above note 28 at 332. 
 
40 Ibid. And yet, this prevailing view in Hanefilte law is not without a dissent. See e.g I. 
al-H ̣alabī (d. 956\ca. 1578), Matn multaqā ’l-abḥur (Misr (Egypt)): Muḥammad ‘Alī 
Ṣabīḥ, ca. 1960)  [in Arabic] at 160-161 [of which pages I had the benefit of unofficial 
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have recourse against a debtor who has not consented to the hawale.41  Thus, 
there is nothing to preclude the hawale from being instigated by the debtor’s 
order to the paymaster-transferee; the latter will act then to implement the 
order by reaching an agreement with the creditor. It is this agreement which 
gives rise to the hawale. Regardless of whether the hawale is prompted by the 
original debtor-transferor’s order, the agreement between the paymaster and 
the creditor may set limits on the paymaster-transferee’s liability to the 
creditor. Such limits may be linked to the amount due from the paymaster-
transferee to the original debtor-transferor (where there is such an amount 
due) or the existence of a fund.  
 
■ Conversely, under the three other schools, the hawale is a matter to be 
established by the agreement of the creditor with the original debtor-
transferor; neither the agreement nor the consent of the transferee-paymaster 
is required. The latter is dispensed with inasmuch as the transferee-paymaster 
is anyway a debtor to the transferor-debtor. Since under these three schools 
the hawale is conceptualized as the exchange in the creditor’s hands of one 
existing debt (owed by the debtor to the creditor) by another debt (owed by 
the paymaster to the debtor), its operation does not adversely affect the 
paymaster who remains charged with his original liability, though to a 
different person.  
 
■ Furthermore, in that regard, Hanbali law goes even further that Maliki and 
Shafi’i schools, in dispensing altogether even with the creditor’s consent as a 
formal requirement for the establishment of a hawale, as long as the 
transferee-paymaster, who is to replace the original debtor, is solvent. Hanbali 
law thus effectively transforms the hawale to a unilateral act of the transferor-
original debtor. 
 
2.  Is transferee (paymaster) to be indebted to transferor (original debtor)? 
 
■ According to the Hanafi school, there is no requirement for a preexisting 
debt owed by the paymaster-transferee to the original debtor-transferor; being 
a voluntary undertaking by him, the paymaster-transferee may incur liability 
on a hawale as he wishes, whether or not he is indebted to the transferor-
original debtor.42  
                                                                                                                                                 
translation] who requires the debtor’s consent to be added to the paymaster-creditor 
agreement. 
 
41 Compared to Chéron and Fahmy Bey, above note 31 at 147-148 (as further discussed in 
text & note 76 below), Chehata, above note 21 at 100 is more definite on this point. 
 
42 In fact, the Hanafi school rationalizes the hawale not only on the Prophet’s injunction, 
referred to around note 31 above, but also upon the voluntary undertaking of the 




■ Conversely, all other schools envisage the paymaster-transferee’s liability 
being incurred by means of a hawale irrespective of his volition; as indicated, 
this is reasonable only as long as he has anyway been liable for the money 
owed, albeit to another person, namely, the original debtor-transferor.  
 
■ Some flexibility exists, however, in Hanbali law, which facilitates the 
hawale even in the absence of a debt owed by the paymaster-transferee to the 
original debtor-transferor. In such a case the hawale is construed as a contract 
of agency under which the paymaster-transferee is authorized by the creditor 
to disburse a loan to the original debtor-transferor. Acting on this authority, 
the paymaster-transferee extends this loan to the original debtor-transferor by 
voluntarily (either paying or) incurring liability to the creditor, in discharge of 
the original’s debtor liability to the creditor. Thereby the creditor becomes 
entitled to payment from the paymaster-transferee, to whom in turn, the 
debtor-transferor becomes liable on the loan.  
 
■ An attempted hawale by a paymaster-transferee who does not owe to the 
transferor is treated by the adherents of the Maliki school as an undertaking to 
pay the debt of another (namely, that of the original debtor). Such paymaster’s 
undertaking constitutes an “indemnity” contract.43
 
3.  Is recourse available to the creditor against the transferor (original debtor)? 
 
■ The general rule in Islamic law is that a suretyship does not discharge the 
liability of the principal debtor to the guaranteed debt.44 Being conceptualized 
by Hanafi law as the paymaster-transferee’s guarantee, the hawale ought to 
have accommodated a continuous original debtor-transferor’s liability to the 
creditor.45 Ultimately, however, the notion that prevailed in Hanafi law is 
                                                 
43 Talbi, above note 16 at 433 does not use the term ‘indemnity’ (or any equivalent in 
French) and refers to such a contract as hamāla. However, according to Foster, the 
hamala, which is a synonym of kafla, is an ordinary guarantee, so that the indemnity 
contract which “should not be confused with the hamala” is the haml. See NHD Foster, 
“The Islamic Law of Guarantees” (2001), 16 Arab Law Quarterly 133, 152. The 
indemnity contract is further discussed in connection with the ensuing points.  
 
44 See e.g. Schacht, Introduction, above note 21 at 158-159. This is so at least as long as 
the guarantee was given at the request of the principal debtor. 
 
45 According to this logic, it is the paymaster-transferee’s liability which should have 
been secondary, or contingent upon the original debtor-transferor’s (primary debtor’s) 
default. But see e.g. van den Berg, above note 34 at 101 who speaks of the effect of the 
hawela under Hanafi law to confer a conditional discharge upon the original debtor, 
pending a default by the paymaster-transferee (which is obviously the reverse of an 
ordinary suretyship or guarantee).   
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premised on the hawale’s effect to ‘remove’ or transfer the debt from the 
original debtor-transferor to the paymaster-transferee; accordingly, the 
original debtor-transferor is to be discharged altogether, other than when 
collection from the paymaster-transferee becomes impossible.46  Thus, the 
original debtor-transferor is taken to remain liable, though only contingently 
and in a quite limited way, in circumstances described as involving “the 
destruction of the debt” owed by the paymaster-transferee to the creditor. 
Thus, in Hanafi law, once a hawale has been made, the original debtor-
transferor becomes liable to the creditor upon the paymaster-transferee’s death 
in poverty, as well as when the paymaster-transferee denies the hawale which 
nevertheless cannot be proven by the creditor. This contingent liability is 
rationalized as analogous to the implied warranty of a seller of goods as to 
their quality.47   
 
■ In contrast, consistently with their treatment of the hawlae as a transfer or 
sale of a debt, upon the paymaster-transferee’s default, all other schools deny 
to the creditor recourse against the original debtor-transferor.  Yet, other than 
under the Shafi’i school, this principle is subject to exceptions. 
 
■ Thus, in Maliki law, recourse against the original debtor-transferor is 
available to the creditor under prescribed narrow circumstances. First, 
recourse is available against the original debtor-transferor when he is guilty of 
misrepresentation. Second, recourse is available against the original debtor-
transferor where the paymaster-transferee is shown to have been insolvent 
already at the time of the hawale.48 In fact, these are apparent and not real 
exceptions; continuous debtor-transferor’s liability under Maliki law is more 
for misrepresentation and breach of warranty relating to the paymaster-
                                                 
46 For this conceptualization of the creditor’s recourse against the original debtor-
transferor see E. Tyan, “Le transport de dettes en droit Ottoman” (1925), 1 Gazette des 
Tribunaux Libano-Syriens, no. 2, 25, at 29 (hereafter: Tyan, Transport). 
 
47 For this summary and the quotation see the Hedya, above note 28 at 332-333. See also 
Chéron and Fahmy Bey, above note 31 at 140 and 162-167 (further elaborating on the 
controversies and their resolution over the centuries), and Tyan, Transport, ibid. at 28-29. 
According to the Hedya, ibid, paymaster-transferee’s insolvency (or poverty) prior to 
death may be temporary and thus does not destroy the paymaster-transferee’s debt owed 
to the creditor so as to revive the original debtor-transferor’s liability. But cf. Tyan, ibid. 
who (in connection with the 19th century Ottoman codification of Hanafi law discussed 
further below in §2.3) nevertheless enumerates also the adjudication of the paymaster-
transferee’s bankruptcy as an event that revives the original debtor-transferor’s liability. 
Certainly, bankruptcy adjudication and the ensuing bankruptcy discharge did not exist in 
Medieval Islam (or elsewhere during that time). 
 
48 According to Khalîl ben Ish’âq above note 34 at 69 this is so only where the original 
debtor-transferor was aware of the paymaster-transferee’s insolvency.    
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transferee’s obligation and solvency than under a pure recourse for non-
payment by the paymaster-transferee.49  
 
■ Hanbali law further restricts the creditor’s recourse against the original 
debtor-transferor to a case of paymaster’s insolvency, but only in 
circumstances of an obvious error, as well as where the debtor either expressly 
warranted the paymaster’s solvency or deceived the creditor in that respect. 
  
■ In general, all four schools allow creditor’s recourse against the debtor 
when the requirements for effectuating a valid hawale have not been satisfied. 
An unresolved question in the Hanafi, Maliki and Shafi’i schools is the effect 
of an express stipulation50 by the creditor as to either availability of recourse 
against, or continued liability of, the original debtor, whether in general, or 
under specified circumstances.51    
 
■ As discussed, an attempted hawale by a paymaster-transferee who does not 
owe to the transferor is treated in Maliki law as an undertaking to pay the debt 
of another (namely, that of the original debtor). Such paymaster’s undertaking 
constitutes an “indemnity” contract.52 An indemnity contract is created by 
                                                 
49 Another apparent exception under Maliki law is where a person voluntarily assumes a 
debt of another, in which case, upon his death or insolvency, recourse is available to the 
creditor against the original debtor. Malik ibn Anas, above note 34 at 309 (§36.31). Per 
Maliki doctrine this is however not a case of hawale, which is established by the 
agreement of the original debtor and creditor, and does not involve the voluntary 
undertaking of the paymaster. 
 
50 Throughout this Paper, “stipulation” is used in the modern sense of the word, denoting 
a contractual term or undertaking. Islamic law does not have a category of a unilateral, 
formal, verbal, and stricti juris contract, such as the stipulatio under Roman law, whose 
formation requires a question to be asked by the stipulant,  a would-be promissee-
creditor, immediately followed by an affirmative answer given by the person to whom the 
question was directed, who thereby becomes the promissor-debtor.  Berger, above note 
30 at 716.  
 
51 Chéron and Fahmy Bey, above note 31 discuss this issue at 170-172 for all three 
schools but do not mention it in connection with Hanabali law. On the basis of the                                          
restrictive view of the Hanabali school on the availability of recourse (as in fact pointed 
out by these authors, ibid. at 171-172), one may speculate that this school does not treat 
such stipulation as effective. According to van den Berg, above note 34 at 101, in Shafi’i 
law, recourse cannot be made available even by contract; Chéron and Fahmy Bey ibid. at 
172 acknowledge this to be the dominant view of the Shafi’i school but cite a Shafi’ite 
opinion according to which this is an effective stipulation as long as it is stated to be an 
essential condition to the creditor’s consent.   
 
52 See text & note 43 above.  
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express words of the indemnifier and is treated as an undertaking by him to 
substitute the original debtor who is thereby released. No recourse against the 
original debtor is thus available to the creditor who accepted the indemnity. 
This is however only as long as the indemnity contract was pronounced 
between the indemnifier and the creditor in a clear and unambiguous 
language; otherwise, as where the creditor is not aware of the fact that he is 
paid out of an overdrawn account of the debtor,53 the latter remains bound on 
his original debt to the creditor.54   
 
4.  What are transferee (paymaster)’s defences?  
 
■ Under Hanafi law the paymaster-transferee becomes liable to the creditor on the 
original debtor-transferor’s engagement; he ought thus to be able to raise 
defences available to the original debtor-transferor against the creditor.55 In 
principle, however, as against the creditor, the paymaster may not be able to 
raise his own defences arising from his relationship with the original debtor-
transferor, at least insofar as the hawale was not stated to be conditional on 
the original debtor-transferor’s entitlement from the paymaster-transferee.56
 
■ Conversely, according to all other schools, the paymaster remains liable on 
his original liability, which is redirected from the original debtor-transferor to 
the creditor. It follows that defences available to the paymaster on his original 
liability to the original debtor-transferor are neither extinguished nor 
substituted by those of the original debtor-transferor vis-à-vis the creditor; 
they remain fully available to the paymaster against the creditor. Certainly, the 
paymaster-transferee may not meet the creditor’s action by raising the original 
debtor-transferor’s defences against the creditor. 
 
■ Under the Shafi’i school, the picture is however not as straight forward. 
Indeed, defences available to the original debtor-transferor against the creditor 
may not be relied upon the paymaster-transferee. This is however at least as 
long as they have been discovered after payment; an effective rescission of the 
obligation owed by the original debtor-transferor to the creditor, occurring 
prior to payment to the creditor by the paymaster-transferee, is seen by some 
as a basis for invalidating the hawale, namely for disentitling the creditor to 
                                                 
53 Ibid. 
 
54 Talbi, above note 16 at 433 and Foster, above note 43 at 152-153. 
 
55 This is also the view of Chéron and Fahmy Bey, above note 31 at 174-175. See text & 
note 83 below. But see the statement to the contrary (unaccompanied by analysis) by C. 
Chehata, above note 21 at 101.  
 
56 Which is the case of a restricted hawale defined in Article 678 of the Mejelle, and 
discussed in text around note 90 below. 
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claim from the paymaster-transferee. Furthermore, paymaster-transferee may 
not assert against the creditor defences available to him against the original 
debtor-transferor, other than when the transaction between them, namely, 
between the paymaster-transferee and the original debtor-transferor, is void.57  
 
■ Regardless, so far as I can tell, no law has developed as to the availability to 
the paymaster-transferee against the creditor of defences that arise after the 
paymaster-transferee becomes liable to the creditor. Such defences may exist 
on the obligation on which the paymaster-transferee is now liable to the 
creditor, whether it is that of the original debtor-transferor to the creditor 
(under Hanafi law), or of the paymaster-transferee to the original debtor-
transferor (according to the other schools). Alternatively, such defences may 
arise from any other matter in that bilateral relationship, namely either that of 
original debtor and creditor, or the paymaster and the original debtor. 
 
■ As discussed, an attempted hawale by a paymaster-transferee who does not 
owe to the transferor is treated in Maliki law as an undertaking to pay the debt 
of another (namely, that of the original debtor); such paymaster’s undertaking 
constitutes an “indemnity” contract. An indemnity is conceptualized in 
Islamic law as an undertaking to discharge another party’s obligation;58 prima 
facie, then, defences available to the debtor against the creditor may be 
asserted against the creditor by the indemnifier-transferee/paymaster.   
 
5. What securities are available to the creditor? 
 
■ Under Hanafi law the paymaster-transferee becomes liable to the creditor on 
the original debtor-transferor’s engagement; it logically follows that both 
personal and proprietary securities supporting the original debtor’s obligation 
remain intact. At the same time, a personal security in the form of guarantee is 
given to secure the liability of a party trusted by the guarantor; in our case this 
party is the original debtor-transferor. At least in the absence of recourse 
against the original debtor-transferor, it is unfair to force the guarantor to 
stand behind the obligation of another, in our case, the paymaster-transferee. 
For this pragmatic reason Hanafi law releases guarantors. Availability of 
proprietary securities remains contested.59  
  
                                                 
57 Bousquet, Kitâb, above note 34 at 34-35. 
 
58 See text & note 43, above.  
 
59 The question is thoroughly discussed by Chéron and Fahmy Bey, above note 31 at 177-
182. In any event, note that when the property subject to proprietary securities is provided 
by a third person other than the original-debtor-transferor, discharge can be rationalized 
on the same grounds as applicable to the discharge of personal guarantors.  
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■ Conversely, according to all other schools, the paymaster remains liable on 
his original liability, which is redirected from the original debtor-transferor to 
the creditor; it would thus appear that securities given to support his 
obligation, whether in the form of personal guarantees or property, remain 
fully effective. 
 
■ As discussed, an attempted hawale by a paymaster-transferee who does not 
owe to the transferor is treated by the adherents of the Maliki school as an 
undertaking to pay the debt of another (namely, that of the original debtor). 
Such paymaster’s undertaking constitutes an “indemnity” contract. An 
indemnity is conceptualized in Islamic law as an undertaking to discharge 
another party’s obligation;60 prima facie, then, availability to the paymaster of 
securities supporting the debtor’s obligation to the creditor is governed by the 
same rules applicable the availability of such securities to the paymaster in a 
hawale governed by Hanafi law.61  
 
In the final analysis, the approaches of the two principal schools, the Hanafi and 
Maliki, can be summarized as follows:  
 
1. Under Hanafi law, the parties to the hawale agreement are the paymaster and 
creditor. Under Maliki rules they are the debtor and creditor; 
 
2.  The paymaster must have owed the debtor under Maliki law but not necessarily 
according to the Hanafi school; 
 
3. In the case of default by the paymaster, both schools usually do not permit the 
recourse by the creditor against the debtor. Each restricts it only to exceptional 
cases;  
 
4.  Under Hanafi rules, the creditor is enforcing against the paymaster the debtor’s 
debt owed to the creditor. On the other hand, under Maliki rules, the creditor is 
enforcing against the paymaster the paymaster’s debt against the debtor. 
Accordingly, under Hanafi law, when sued by the creditor, the paymaster may 
raise the debtor’s, but not his own, defences. Conversely, under Maliki rules, the 
paymaster may raise against the creditor his (but not the debtor’s) defences. 
 
5. However, as towards the creditor attempting to recover from the paymaster, 
Hanafi rules release the debtor’s guarantors; whether they also discharge 
proprietary securities supporting the debtor’s obligation remains contested. At the 
same time, under Maliki law, both personal and proprietary securities given to 
support the paymaster’s obligation are enforceable by the creditor.  
 
                                                 
60 See text & note 43, above. 
 
61 For these rules see text & note 59, above. 
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 On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the following two complementary 
observations are to be made on the legal nature of the hawale by reference to legal 
mechanisms that developed in Roman law:  
 
I. Indeed, the underlying theory of hawale is that of substitution of debtors; this 
distinguishes it from the cession which is premised on the substitution of 
creditors. However, as indicated, under all Islamic schools other than the 
Hanafi, the hawale is established by the agreement between the original 
debtor-transferor and the creditor, with no resort whatsoever to the consent of 
the paymaster-transferee (namely, the debtor to the original debtor). In this 
framework, its mode of establishment and consequences are quite the same as 
that of the cessio under Roman law.62 Specifically, other than under Hanafi 
law, and notwithstanding what may be the orthodox view to the contrary,63 
the hawale operates in the same way as the non-recourse outright assignment 
for value of debt.64 
 
II. Conversely, in Hanafi law, the hawale is established by the agreement of the 
paymaster-transferee and the creditor. In this framework, the mode of 
operation and consequences of the hawlae are quite analogous then to the 
prefect execution of a delegation order under Roman law.65     
 
§2.3 Codification of Hanafi law: the hawale under the Mejelle 
 
                                                 
62 For cessio in Roman law see note 30 above. 
 
63 Thus, sources cited in note 34 above deal with the hawale as a ‘delegation’. 
 
64 In the pre-2001 Official Texts of the American Uniform Commercial Code (e.g. 1962, 
1972, and 1978), Official Comment 1 to Section 9-308 set out the various arrangements 
for the assignment of debts under modern law and practice. 
 
65 In its narrow sense, “delegation” has been defined in Roman law as an order given by 
one person (“delegant”) to another (“person to be delegated”) to pay to, or assume an 
obligation towards, a third person (“delegatee”). In its broader sense, it has come also to 
include the execution of the order. For the definition of delegatio see e.g. Berger, above 
note 30 at 429. For the perfect execution by means of novation by stipulation in Roman 
law see a particularly comprehensive and useful discussion by S. Maxwell, De la 
délégation en droit romain, (Bordeaux: Imprimerie Ve  Cadoret 1895)  at 55-57 and 67- 
105. I disagree with Tyan, Cession, above note 22 at 29 who treats the hawale under 
Hanafi law as a cession. His analysis is stated (at 28 n.7) to be limited to a restricted 
hawale, for which however, in connection with Article 693 of the Mejelle, an alternative 
explanation is provided in text around notes 97-98 below. 
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As of the 16th century CE, Hanafi law had enjoyed exclusive official recognition 
in the entire Ottoman Empire.66 On civil matters it became the law of the land; the 
process culminated with the promulgation in 1877 of the Mejelle as the Ottoman Civil 
Code. The Mejelle is the first attempt to codify Islamic law; “derived entirely from 
Hanafī law,”67 its stated purpose was to provide the recently created secular courts with 
“an authoritative statement of the doctrine of Islamic law.”68 In many lands which had 
previously formed the Ottoman Empire, the Mejelle, at least in part, survived as a civil 
code, long after the dismantling of the Empire itself after World War I.69  Indeed, the 
Mejelle was passed centuries after the early Medieval period; strictly speaking, it cannot 
be taken as a precise record of the law of that period. Possible gaps in our knowledge 
may have existed; as well, fine-tuning and resolution of some points may have taken 
place over the centuries. Nevertheless, for our purposes, it may be useful to examine the 
Mejelle provisions governing the hawale as a statutory embodiment of Hanafi law 
doctrine, and as such as an indication of an outline pertaining to, and in general 
confirming, the content of the Medieval law.  
 
The hawale is governed by Book IV of the Mejelle (consisting of Articles 673-
700).70 It is defined in Article 673 as a transfer of a debt from its debtor to another 
                                                 
66 See Schacht, Introduction, above note 21 at 65 and 89-93. At its peak, the empire 
extended from Anatolia to west of the Bosphorus in the North, and from Mesopotamia 
and west Arabia to the western Mediterranean in the south. For a map visit 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Ottoman_small_animation.gif>. 
 
67 Coulson, above note 1 at 151. 
 
68 Schacht, Introduction, above note 21 at 92, relying on the explanatory memorandum.  
One stated rationale was the fact that “the Hanefite school did not crystallize … but … 
has split up into innumerable sections and opposing sub-divisions.” See Report of the 
Commission Appointed to Draft the Mejelle, reproduced in Hooper, above note 28 
Volume I at 1, 3. See also Coulson, ibid. at 151-152. 
 
69 For some information see Schacht, ibid. at 93. In Israel, particularly with the ongoing 
passage of laws envisaged to become part of a modern civil code, the application of the 
Mejelle provisions had been gradually eroded but it was repealed as a binding law only as 
late as 1984. See Repeal of Mejelle Law, 5744-1984, Laws of the State of Israel: 
Authorized Translation from the Hebrew, Volume 38. Government Printer, Jerusalem, 
Israel (1948-1989), p. 212. Full text can be visited at 
<http://www.geocities.com/savepalestinenow/israellaws/fulltext/repealofmejelle.htm>. In 
recent decades the Mejelle has gained fresh attention as seen in the codification of the 
new Civil Code of the United Arab Emirates in 1985. Visit: 
<http://www.amazon.com/Mejelle-Complete-Code-Islamic-Civil/dp/9839541129>. 
 
70 The Mejelle, translated by CR Tyser, (Lahore: All Pakistan Legal Decisions, 1967, 
Reprint of 1901 ed.) Another translation is that of Hooper, above note 28 Volume I., of 
which Book IV: Transfer of Debt is reproduced in the Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 3 
(Aug., 1987), 311 and can be visited at: <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0268-
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person. It was judicially described in Cyprus as “a transaction in which one person 
assumes the obligation of another.”71 In the language of Articles 674-677, the original 
debtor, who is described as the hawale maker, is the Muhil. His creditor is the Muhal. 
The new debtor, “who accepts a hawale to himself,” is called Muhal aley-h. Finally, the 
“the thing which is transferred by hawale,” is Muhal bih.  
 
In our terminology, the participants in a hawale are, respectively, debtor 
(corresponding to the Muhil), creditor (corresponding to the Muhal), and the paymaster 
(corresponding to the Muhal aley-h). According to Article 688, the debt subject to the 
hawale, namely, the debt owed by the debtor to the creditor and taken over by the 
paymaster, must be for a fixed sum72 and may be “any debt, for which a good guarantee 
can be given”. Per Articles 612 and 631 it must then be arising from an existing 
obligation.73   
 
The Mejelle enumerates four alternative methods for the creation of a binding 
hawale which can thus be established: 
 
1. By the unilateral declaration of  the debtor to the creditor followed by the 
acceptance of the creditor and paymaster (Article 680);  
   
2. By means of a contract concluded between the creditor and the paymaster (Article 
681); 
 
3. By means of a contract concluded between the debtor and creditor followed by 
the acceptance by the paymaster “after notice” (Article 682); or 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
0556(198708)2%3A3%3C311%3ATMBITO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B>.  For an analysis of 
these provisions under the laws of Palestine and Israel as they were at the time see Z. 
Zeltner, Law of Contracts General Part Volume I (Tel Aviv: Avukah, 1963) ) [in 
Hebrew] at 360-372. 
 
71 Hussein Mustafa v. Osman Ismael, (1909) 8 Cypr. LR 125, at 127. See also Imperial 
Ottoman Bank v. Limbouri, (1897) 4 Cypr. LR 48, at 50 speaking of the hawale as 
contemplating the transfer of a debt in the sense of “the substitution of one debtor for 
another.” To a similar effect in Israel see CA 492/60, Moral v. Karbatzov,15 PD 1776, at 
1785 (SC) [in Hebrew]. 
 
72 To that end, under Article 688,“if someone says ‘I have accepted by way of hawale 
what it shall be proved you have to receive from such a one, the hawale is not good’”. 
 
73  Certainly, the ‘guaranteeable debt’ requirement is indication to the drafters’ adherence 
to the Hanafi school. For the Hanafi classification of the hawale as a contract or 
guarantee see text & note 36, above.   
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4.  By the agreement of the debtor and paymaster, in which case it becomes a 
concluded contract “subject to the acceptance of the creditor” (Article 683). 
 
All methods other than the second effectively require the agreement and consent 
of all three participants. In contrast, the second method dispenses with the consent of the 
debtor and permits the hawale to be established on the basis of the bilateral agreement 
between the paymaster and creditor. Effectively then, and in the footsteps of Hanafi law, 
the establishment of the hawale does not hinge on the consent of the debtor, but rather 
draws on the agreement between the paymaster74 and the creditor,75 to which the debtor’s 
agreement or consent may be added and yet is irrelevant. Another way to say it is that a 
hawale can even be made over the objections of the debtor.76  
 
Indeed, a bilateral agreement, between either the debtor and creditor or the debtor 
and the paymaster, is binding on them, though only pending the acceptance by the third 
participant, namely the paymaster in the first case and the creditor in the second one.77 
Otherwise, among the three methods premised on a three-way agreement, that is, all 
methods other than the second, the difference is only in the chain of communication, 
which may give a different role to the agreement or consent of a participant. For example, 
while the paymaster’s acceptance is required under the fourth method for the initial 
creation of the hawale, under the first and third methods it is required in order to 
complete a hawale already agreed or declared. As well, the first method presumably 
envisages that all three participants, or at least the creditor and the paymaster, are to be 
                                                 
74 However, at least with respect to a restricted hawale (to be discussed further below) in 
which the debtor instructs the paymaster to pay the creditor out of what the paymaster 
owes the debtor, it was historically debated whether the consent of the paymaster is 
required. In support, it was acknowledged that the paymaster’s terms of indebtedness do 
not vary by the mere change of creditors, and yet it was argued that the paymaster may be 
disadvantaged by being required to pay a more demanding or harsher creditor. See 
Chéron and Fahmy Bey, above note 31 at 149-150.  
 
75 With respect, I do not follow Tyan, who highlights the principal role of the paymaster’s 
consent towards the debtor and goes on to state that “the consent of the creditor is a 
necessary element but not essential of the [hawale] contract”. See Tyan, Transport, above 
note 46 at 26. 
 
76 It is however possible though that a debtor who has not consented may not be liable to 
be sued by the paymaster for reimbursement, in which case the paymaster’s recourse may 
then be limited to debtor’s assets available under his hands (including a debt owed to 
him). The theory behind this limitation is that an honorable person is unlikely to agree 
that a stranger will pay his debt. See Chéron and Fahmy Bey, above note 31 at 147-148. 
As indicated in note 41 above, Chehata, above note 21 at 100 is more definite in stating 
that recourse is not available against a non-consenting debtor. 
 
77 Cf. Tyan, Transport, above note 46 at 35 speaking of the irrevocability by the debtor of 
his agreement with the paymaster, pending the acceptance by the creditor. 
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present at the same time in the same place; conversely, the third method must be taken to 
contemplate that the paymaster is not present at the time of the agreement between the 
debtor and creditor.78 Either way, all methods other than the second one envisage 
situations in which the hawale is created by means of the consent and agreement of all 
three participants. And yet, as indicated, in the final analysis, it is the paymaster-creditor 
bilateral agreement that forms a binding hawale. 
 
Overall, the participants are not required to be present together at the time and 
place of the conclusion of the hawale; the interpretation of Article 680 as possibly 
envisaging a presence-of-all-three scenario is designed only in order to distinguish the 
case governed by it from that governed by Article 682. Under all four methods, and 
regardless of the order of communication, no particular formality is mandated for the 
creation of a binding hawale. It can be made either orally or in writing, either explicitly 
or implicitly, and either in advance or retroactively.   
 
The hawale is concerned with the transfer of an obligation from its original debtor 
to a new one, or in our terminology, from the debtor to the paymaster. As already 
indicated, it is distinguishable from the Roman cessio79 which is concerned with the 
transfer by one person to another of a debt owed to the former. In our scenario, a cessio 
would be the transfer by the debtor to the creditor, of the debt owed to the debtor by the 
paymaster. Conversely, the hawale is the transfer from the debtor to the paymaster of the 
obligation to pay the debt owed by the debtor to the creditor; it is a matter to be agreed 
upon between the creditor and the paymaster. The Roman cessio, being in our case a 
cession or assignment of a debt owed to the debtor, is a matter between the 
‘cessionaire’/‘assignor’ (the debtor in our case) and the ‘cessionary’/‘assignee’ (being the 
creditor in our case) and does not require the consent of the ‘account debtor’ (in our case 
the paymaster).80          
                                                 
78 Thus, in contrast to Article 682, Article 680 does not envisage a separate notice given 
to the paymaster that is thus to be taken as present with the creditor, at the time the 
debtor’s declaration is made. However, Article 680 may not preclude the communication 
of the debtor’s declaration to the creditor other than by being together with him at the 
same place. At the same time, the example given for the operation of Article 682 is that 
of “someone [who] makes a hawale of his creditor to the account of someone, who is in 
another country”, who subsequently “and after the creditor has accepted … after notice, 
also accepts,” and thus is not present at the time the hawale is agreed between the debtor 
and creditor. Emphasis added.   
 
79 The distinction between these two institutions along the lines set out below was noted 
in Cyprus in Hussein Mustafa above note 71 at 127, which was followed in the British 
Mandate of Palestine in CA 96/42, Kremenetzky (Administrator of the Estate) v. Anglo-
Palestine Bank, 9 PLR 559, at 564(SC) and CC Haifa 187/46, Palestine Land 
Development Co. v. Yalonetsky, 1947 SCDC 91, at 93. The distinction was subsequently 
endorsed by the Supreme Court of Israel in CA 352/58, Levin v. Rehovot, 45 PE (SCJ) 
196, at 201 [in Hebrew].  
 
80 For the cessio in Roman law, see note 30 above.   
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At the same time, by comparison to Roman law, the hawale appears to operate 
very much, though as will be seen immediately below, not exactly,  like the first case of a 
qualified delegation executed by the paymaster’s undertaking to pay the creditor the debt 
owed by the debtor to the creditor.81 It involves novation by means of a change in the 
debtor owing on the debtor’s obligation to the creditor;82 in this case, the transfer of a 
debt or passive obligation takes place, so that the paymaster becomes liable to the 
creditor on the debtor’s original obligation, and hence, only to the extent that the debtor 
would have owed the creditor.  
 
The consequences of the hawale are stated in Article 690 to be the discharge of 
the (original) debtor, as well as the release of any pledge or guaranty provided to secure 
his discharged original obligation. In turn, “the right to demand that debt from the person, 
who accepts the hawale, is established for the creditor” (emphasis added). To that end, 
per Article 697, while an agreement to the contrary is not precluded, the time in which 
the paymaster is to pay the creditor is the same as the time the debtor would have been 
required to pay. It logically follows that that the paymaster may invoke against the 
creditor any defence that would have been available to the debtor against the creditor.83 It 
would have further followed that the creditor remains entitled to the benefit of all 
securities given by the debtor, except that as was already indicated, on that point Article 
690 explicitly provides for the opposite, namely for the forfeiture of all pledges and 
guarantees supporting the debtor’s original obligation.84  
 
As indicated, Article 690 enumerates the discharge of the original debtor-
transferor as a consequence of the hawale. Nevertheless, in the footsteps of Hanafi 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
81 The various types of delegations are discussed by Maxwell, above note 65 at 55- 57 and 
88-95 (particularly 90-92).  
 
82 But cf. Chéron and Fahmy Bey, above note 31 at 173 who reject the novation theory, 
albeit overlooking the possibility of a novation by the mere substitution of parties.  
 
83 Which is indeed the conclusion of Chéron and Fahmy Bey, ibid. at 174-175, who 
further explain that in Islamic law such defences include the extinction of the debt owed 
by the debtor to the creditor by the automatic setoff between that debt and a debt owed by 
the creditor to the debtor arising prior to the hawale. For the availability to the paymaster 
of all defences to an action on the transferred debt (namely the debt owed by the debtor to 
the creditor) see also Tyan, Transport, above note 46 at 31.  
 
84 In the absence of a recourse against the debtor, forfeiture of guarantees (as well as of 
proprietary securities provided by third parties) may nonetheless be logically explained 
by the reliance of a guarantor (as well as a third-party securities provider) on the personal 
liability of the debtor (and not the paymaster) against whom he is entitled, upon payment 
to the creditor, to indemnity.  See e.g. Tyan, Transport, above note 46 at 34-35 and text & 
note 59 above. 
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doctrine, and notwithstanding what may be its plain meaning to the contrary, Article 690 
is interpreted to read that discharge of the debtor is conditional; in fact the paymaster’s 
acceptance of the hawale operates to suspend the debtor’s obligation pending payment by 
the paymaster. Otherwise, upon the latter’s default, recourse is available to the creditor 
against the debtor, though only in specified narrow circumstances, such as the insolvency 
of the paymaster, at least after his death,  as well as when the paymaster-transferee denies 
the hawale which nevertheless cannot be proven by the creditor.85 As will be seen further 
below, recourse against the original debtor is stated to be available to the creditor in a 
restricted hawale, namely, one stated to be payable out of a designated fund or upon the 
fulfillment of another condition, but only where the paymaster’s obligation to the debtor 
is void. 
 
According to Articles 699-700, the person who accepts a hawale, that is, the 
paymaster in our scenario, is discharged from his engagement86 when he:  
 
(a) pays the debtor’s debt owing to the creditor; 
 
(b) makes a subsequent hawale;87 
 
(c) receives an acquittance from the creditor; 
 
(d) accepts from the creditor the subject-matter of the hawale as a gift or alms; or 
 
(e) becomes the heir of the creditor upon the latter’s death. 
    
The Mejelle provides for a detailed scheme governing the relationship between 
the paymaster and the debtor. In principle, according to Article 698, prior to making 
                                                 
85 For the Hanafi doctrine on the point, see text & notes 46-47above. For the 
interpretation by the Mejelle according to this doctrine see Chéron and Fahmy Bey, 
above note 31 at 162-167 and Tyan, ibid. at 28-29. The controversy regarding an 
insolvent living paymaster has to do with the possible transformation of his position 
which is obviously impossible for an insolvent estate of a dead paymaster. Ibid.  
 
86 In all cases enumerated below, discharge is absolute. According to Chéron and Fahmy 
Bey, above note 31 at 182-183 this is so also in connection with discharge by making a 
subsequent hawale, upon which the original debtor-transferor’s obligation remains 
suspended while that of the paymaster-transferee (becoming a second transferor) is 
absolutely discharged. 
 
87 Which could be a mechanism for the circulation of credit as under Roman law as 
touched upon in note 228 & text below. As to hawale as an instrument for the circulation 
of credit see text & note 122 below. 
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payment to the creditor, the paymaster “has no claim on the debtor.”88 Upon making the 
payment, the paymaster’s claim against the debtor is limited to “the thing which is the 
subject of the hawale,”89 and yet, the method of enforcement of the claim depends on the 
circumstances.  
 
To begin with, the Mejelle distinguishes between an absolute and restricted 
hawale. An absolute hawale, or hawale mutlaqua, is defined in Article 679 “not [to be] 
restricted for payment to be made from property of the [debtor], or in the hands of the 
[paymaster].” Stated otherwise, an absolute hawale is not sated to be paid out of a debt 
owed by the paymaster to the debtor. Conversely, under Article 678, a restricted hawale, 
or hawale muqayyede, is “a hawale restricted by a stipulation, for the [paymaster] to pay 
from the property of the [debtor], owed to him by the [paymaster], or in the hands of the 
[paymaster].” Stated otherwise, a restricted hawale is typically to be paid out of a debt 
owed by the paymaster to the debtor.90    
 
It is to be noted that the distinction between a restricted and unrestricted hawale is 
not on the basis of whether the paymaster is indebted to the debtor; rather, it is on the 
basis of whether payment by the paymaster to the creditor is stated to be out, and thus 
dependent on the existence, of a debt owed by the paymaster to the debtor. Certainly, a 
restricted hawale, payable out of a debt owed by the paymaster to the debtor, is premised 
on the existence of such a debt and is irreconcilable with its absence. On the other hand, 
an absolute hawale is consistent either with the existence or absence of a debt owed by 
the paymaster to the debtor; rather, it is premised on the obligation of the paymaster to 
the creditor not being dependent on the existence of a debt owed by the paymaster to the 
debtor, regardless of whether such a debt exists. The absolute hawale is thus reconcilable 
with both the existence and absence of a debt owed by the paymaster to the debtor.   
 
Accordingly, with regard to a paymaster who paid the creditor in discharge of the 
debt assumed under an absolute hawale,91 Article 691 distinguishes between two 
                                                 
88 Strictly speaking, Article 698 deals with a paymaster who “has paid the debt.” Quaere 
whether or to what extent it also covers discharge by any other method as provided by 
Articles 699-700 discussed above. 
 
89 Article 698 which goes on to provide the following example: “If … the subject of the 
[hawale] is silver [coins] and [the paymaster] pays gold, he takes from the debtor … 
silver [coins], he cannot demand gold.”  Chéron and Fahmy Bey, above note 31 at 156-
157 analyze the situation as subrogation.  
 
90 Alternatively, per Article 696, a restricted hawale may be stated to be payable “from 
the price realised [sic] on the sale of fixed property of his own” in which case the 
paymaster “is bound to pay the creditor from the price realised on the sale of that 
property.”  
 
91 Strictly speaking, Article 691 speaks of “payment” by the paymaster. Quaere whether 
or to what extent it also covers discharge by any other method as provided by Articles 
699-700 discussed above.   
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situations.92 The first is the case in which the debtor “has nothing to receive from the 
person who accepts the hawale,” namely, where the debtor is not owed by the paymaster. 
The second case is “where there is anything to receive.” In the former case, after payment 
to the creditor, the paymaster who did not owe the debtor “can claim against” the debtor, 
namely, is entitled to be indemnified by him. In the latter case, upon making payment to 
the creditor, a paymaster who owed the debtor is entitled to a discharge from the debtor 
by offsetting his claim to an indemnification from him.93  
 
 No such distinction exists with respect to a restricted hawale; having paid out of a 
debt owed to the debtor, the paymaster must be taken to have gotten his discharge vis-à-
vis the debtor to the extent of the payment. Furthermore, under Article 692, in a case of a 
restricted hawale, the debtor’s claim to the debt owed to him by the paymaster, on which 
the restricted hawale is premised, “ceases”, so that the paymaster “can no longer” pay it 
to the debtor; or else if he pays it to the debtor, he does it at his risk.94  
 
 The Mejelle is however silent as to the impact of an absolute hawale on a debt the 
paymaster may owe the debtor. Indeed, one may have thought that already upon his 
acceptance on which (under Article 690) his liability to the creditor arises and replaces 
that of the debtor, a paymaster owing to the debtor is to be absolutely discharged vis-à-vis 
the debtor. This is however not taken to be the legal position. Rather, in line with the 
Hanafi thinking on the matter, the acceptance of the hawale by the paymaster does not 
affect his legal relationship with the debtor; side by side with his liability to the creditor 
(under Article 690), a paymaster who accepts an absolute hawale remains liable to the 
debtor until the paymaster pays the creditor.95 In fact, continued liability towards the 
debtor notwithstanding the acceptance of the hawale can possibly be read as a negative 
implication from Article 698, providing that prior to payment the paymaster who 
accepted a hawale “has no claim against the debtor”.  
 
Upon accepting an absolute hawale, the paymaster’s liability to the debtor is not 
even suspended; until payment to the creditor the paymaster is exposed to actions from 
both the debtor and creditor. Payment to the debtor will not discharge the paymaster 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
92 Regardless, as indicated, per Article 698, no right against the debtor arises in favour of 
the paymaster prior to actual payment; a paymaster owing to the debtor remains so liable.   
 
93 As indicated in note 76 above, notwithstanding the silence of the Mejelle on the point, 
it may well be that the former, namely an action (as opposed to a setoff), is not available 
to a paymaster against a debtor who has not consented to the hawale. 
 
94 The provision goes on to state that a paymaster who nevertheless paid the debtor “is 
liable to make compensation” to the creditor and upon making compensation, he becomes 
entitled to claim back from the debtor, and where the debtor dies, he is even entitled to a 
priority vis-à-vis competing creditors’ claims to the debtor’s estate. 
 
95 See Chéron and Fahmy Bey, above note 31 at 155. 
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towards the creditor;96 conversely, actual payment to the creditor will discharge the 
paymaster not only on his acceptance to the creditor (per Article 699), but also on his 
original debt to the debtor (per Article 691).  
 
As already indicated, under Article 690, the hawale establishes in the creditor’s 
hands “the right to demand … from the person who accepts the hawale”, that is the 
paymaster, payment of the debt owed to the creditor by the original debtor. It ought to 
follow that in the case of an absolute hawale, not made conditional or dependent on the 
debt owed by the paymaster to the debtor, a paymaster who owes the debtor may not 
defend the creditor’s claim on the basis of defences the paymaster has against the 
debtor.97 Under Article 693, this is generally true also in the case of a restricted hawale.98   
 
However, for a restricted hawale, three exceptions are stated to exist. First, under 
Article 693, in the case of a restricted hawale in which the paymaster is to pay out of a 
debt owed to the debtor for the price of goods, the paymaster is released towards the 
creditor upon the successful assertion by a third party of an adverse claim to the goods for 
which the price is due. Second, under Article 694, in the case of a restricted hawale in 
which the paymaster is to pay out of a deposit owed by the paymaster to the debtor, the 
paymaster is released towards the creditor upon the successful assertion by a third party 
of an adverse claim to the deposit. Third, under Article 695, in the case of a restricted 
hawale in which the paymaster is to pay out of the debtor’s money held by the paymaster, 
the paymaster is released towards the creditor where that money is lost or destroyed in 
circumstances for which the paymaster does not become liable to the debtor for the loss 
or destruction.99  
 
In all these three cases the restricted hawale is stated to become void, so as to 
refasten the obligation to pay the creditor on the original debtor. For that to happen, it is 
not enough for the paymaster’s obligation to the debtor, out of which payment to the 
creditor to be made, to be voidable, or otherwise subject to defences, even when that 
                                                 
96 Albeit presumably, upon payment to the creditor, a paymaster who earlier paid the 
debtor is entitled to reimbursement from him under Article 691.  
 
97 Tyan, Transport, above note 46 at 31-32. 
 
98 Strictly speaking, the provision deals only with  the case of a restricted hawale in which 
the paymaster is to pay out of a debt owed by him to the debtor for the price of goods, in 
which case the paymaster is not released towards the creditor even “if the price can no 
longer be claimed [by the debtor/seller] in consequence of the thing sold being destroyed 
before delivery, or if the thing sold is returned under a condition giving an option, or an 
option on inspection, or an option for defect, or, if the sale is rescinded.”     
 
99 In all three cases the paymaster is said to be released from his liability to the creditor; 
according to Chéron and Fahmy Bey, above note 31 at 159-160, having already paid the 
creditor prior to learning of circumstances that would have released him, the paymaster is 
to be entitled to restitution from the creditor. 
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obligation was rescinded or otherwise effectively terminated; rather, it must be void ab 
initio. As well, arguably along similar lines, as a matter of principle, in a restricted 
hawale in which the paymaster is to pay out of a debt owed to the debtor or out of any 
other fund, the paymaster’s obligation is subject to the existence and amount of the debt 
or fund, though as indicated, not to defences to liability on the debt or for the payment of 
the fund.100  
 
In fact, for a restrictive hawale, this distinction between a condition as to the 
existence of the debt and as to the availability of defences thereon, is a matter of 
interpretation of the stipulation providing for the condition. Indeed, under the Mejelle, the 
hawale renders the paymaster liable to the creditor on the debt owed to the creditor by the 
original debtor and not on the debt owed by the paymaster to the debtor. This is true for 
both an absolute and restricted hawale. The latter may however be stated to be 
conditional on the existence of a debt owed by the paymaster to the debtor. Unless it is 
stated to be conditional on lack of defences available to the paymaster against the debtor, 
a hawale stated to be conditional on the existence of a debt owed by the paymaster to the 
debtor is to be construed as conditional on the mere existence of the debt. In this context, 
the debt owed by the paymaster to the debtor is deemed to exist also when the action on 
the obligation to pay that debt can successfully be defended, and even when that 
obligation has been effectively repudiated.101  
 
3. The suftaj and other Islamic payment instruments: the hawale applied 
 
§3.1 Islamic payment instruments and the hawale: an overview 
 
Documentation of Islamic payment instruments is quite rich;102 this is particularly 
true for the period of the Fatimid Caliphate, which was in power between the 10th and 
                                                 
100 This may be implied from Article 696, governing the obligation of the paymaster to 
pay “from the price realised from the sale of fixed property of his own” in which case he 
“is bound to pay the creditor from the price realised on the sale of that property.” 
Certainly however, a paymaster who misled the creditor as to the existence or size of the 
debt out of which a restricted hawale is to be paid  may be liable to the creditor on 
grounds other than his acceptance of the hawale.   
 
101 It is particularly the latter situation, based on a distinction between a void contract and 
a contract that has been effectively rescinded or repudiated, which I find unsatisfying. Cf. 
Tyan, Transport, above note 46 speaking at 33 of difficulties in the language of Articles 
694-695. 
 
102 See e.g. SK Bakhsh and DS Margoliouth, The Renaissance of Islam (Translated from 
the German of Adam Mez) (Patna: Jubilee, 1937) at 476-477; and E. Ashtor, “Banking 
Instruments Between the Muslim East and the Christian West” 1 Journal of European 
Economic History, 553; rep. (with same pagination) in E. Ashtor, East-West Trade in the 
Medieval Mediterranean (edited by BZ Kedar) (London: Variorum Reprints, 1986) I. For 
summary and sources see e.g. Ray, above note 34 at 66-79.  
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12th centuries.103 Approximately from that period, or more specifically, between the 11th 
and 13th centuries, plenty of documents104 originate from the Jewish Geniza of Cairo.105   
 
Islamic payment instruments have not always acquired distinct names.  Thus, the 
withdrawal out of an account with a sarraf (private money changer) in the execution of a 
non-cash payment made by a small retailer to his wholesaler may be treated simply as a 
hawale.106 In turn, more specialized terminology, though not necessarily uniform or 
precise, has also developed.107 Thus, the ruq’a has a few meanings. First, it means an 
order for the delivery of goods. Second, it is a payment order issued to the payee 
instructing the paymaster to make payment against its presentment by the person entitled 
to obtain payment. Third, it denotes the paymaster’s own obligation to pay, or in fact, any 
promissor’s debt or acknowledgement of debt instrument.108 The first sense is outside the 
                                                 
103 For the Fatimid Caliphate visit <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatimid>. 
 
104 Research on Geniza payment instruments is still ongoing. The present discussion is 
obviously based on what has so far been published. For now, the ultimate source is SD 
Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, Volume I: Economic Foundations (Berkeley and LA: 
University of California Press, 1967) at 240-250. Other sources are indicated in note 111, 
below. 
 
105 For the Cairo Geniza in general, see SC Reif, A Jewish Archive from Old Cairo, The 
History of Cambridge University’s Genizah Collection (Surrey, Richmond:Curzon, 
2000). Geniza (or Genizah) is a Hebrew word denoting the store-room or depository in a 
synagogue, usually specifically for worn-out Hebrew-language books and papers on 
religious topics that were stored there before they could receive a proper cemetery burial, 
it being forbidden to throw away writings containing the name of God (even personal 
letters and legal contracts could open with an invocation of God). In practice, a geniza 
may have contained writings of a secular nature, with or without the customary opening 
invocation, and also contained writings in other languages that use the Hebrew alphabet. 
(see e.g <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geniza.>. Secular documents in the Cairo Geniza, 
such as payment instruments, were mostly written in Judeo-Arabic (an Arabic dialect 
using Hebrew alphabet) and may have contained the invocation of God. 
 
106 For this practice see text & notes 16-18, above. Certainly however, the document 
implementing the hawale could be a ruq’a or sakk discussed in the text that immediately 
follows.  
 
107 For the sakk and suftaj see e.g. CE Bosworth, “Abū ‘Abdallāh Al-Khwārazmī on the 
Technical Terms of the Secretary’s Art: A Contribution to the Administrative History of 
Mediaeval Islam” (1969), 12 Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient”, 
8 respectively at 125 and 140.   
 
108 For a sakk, from Western Sudan, in effect, in the latter sense, that of an ‘IOU’ 
(acknowledgement of debt) document, see e.g. N. Levtzion, “Ibn-Hawqal, the Cheque, 
and Awdaghost” (1968), 9 Journal of African History” 223 who nevertheless (not having 
in mind precise legal terminology) speaks of the document as a ‘cheque’.  
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scope of the present study; in both the second and third senses, which are of interest in 
the context of the present study, the ruq’a overlaps with the sakk, from which 
linguistically, the modern word ‘cheque’ may be derived.109 In fact the second and third 
meanings may converge; this is so, since the paymaster’s obligation to pay on a ruq’a or 
sakk is typically in pursuance to the payment order issued to the paymaster which is at 
least implicit on the instrument. The express terms of the document may however reflect 
the debtor’s order, the paymaster’s promise, or both.  
 
Typically, a ruq’a or sakk does not designate a named payee and is payable to the 
bearer. As an order to pay addressed to a person acting as a banker, the ruq’a and sakk 
correspond to the modern cheque. As a promise to pay, they correspond to the modern 
promissory note; being payable to the bearer, and inasmuch as the promissor usually acts 
as a banker, in the third above-mentioned sense, they in fact correspond more to the 
eighteenth century banknote.110   
 
A payment instrument to be further discussed is the suftaj; it contains an 
obligation of a paymaster or his correspondent to pay at a place other than that of the 
issue of the document.111 It was thus used for payment or transfer of funds between two 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
109 See e.g. Goitein, above note 104 at 245. 
 
110 For the modern cheque as an instrument containing an unconditional order directed to 
a bank and instructing it to pay on demand, as well as for the promissory note as an 
instrument containing an unconditional promise to pay, see e.g. the English Bills of 
Exchange Act 1882 (c 61), Sections 73  and 83(1), respectively. For the origin of the 
banknote (effectively, the forerunner of the promissory note), as an instrument containing 
an unconditional promise to pay made by a banker, see e.g. B. Geva, “From Commodity 
to Currency in Ancient History - On Commerce, Tyranny, and the Modern Law of 
Money” (1987), 25 Osgoode Hall LJ 115 at 145-155. 
 
111 In addition to sources noted set out in notes 102 and 104 above, various studies in 
Jewish history mention or reproduce original documents (usually translated to the 
language of the study, that is, either English or Hebrew) either (mostly) mentioning or 
constituting suftajs (and occasionally other payment orders). Original documents are 
either in Hebrew or Judeo-Arabic, referring either to suftajs or to the Hebrew equivalent, 
dyokani. Notable examples include: J. Mann, The Jews in Egypt and in Palestine under 
the Fāţimid Caliphs, (Ktav, New York, 1970), Volume I  at 114,  Volume II at 125, 144, 
and 146; EJ Worman, “Forms of Address in Genizah Letters” (1907), 19 Jewish 
Quarterly Review 721, 727; Y. Ben-Zvi, “A Letter from a Jewish Merchant from the 11th 
Century” (1938), 3(NS) Zion, 179, at 182 [in Hebrew]; J. Mann, Texts and Studies in 
Jewish History and Literature (Cincinnati, Ohio: Hebrew Union College Press, 1931) at 
143-144;    M. Gill, Palestine During the First Muslim Period (634-1099) (Tel-Aviv: Tel 
Aviv University, 1983) Part I: Studies at 210, 497, Part II: Cairo Geniza Documents at 
134, 150, and 633, Part III: Cairo Geniza Documents and Indexes at 112, 118, 204, and 
294 [in Hebrew]; and M. Gill, In the Kingdom of Ishmael above note 16, Volume I: 
Studies in Jewish History in Islamic Lands in the Early Middle Ages at 497, 555, and 
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places, possibly from a debtor to a creditor,112 particularly over routes serving permanent 
business connections. In the footsteps of the obligation on a ruq’a or sakk, the 
paymaster’s obligation on the suftaj is in response to a payment order issued to him. 
However, unlike the ruq’a or sakk, the suftaj is typically payable to a named payee and 
not to the bearer.113 The suftaj is said not to be transferable;114 otherwise, it corresponds 
to the bill of exchange115 or letter of credit.116 It raises significant legal issues and thus 
will be discussed further below in greater detail. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
635-641, Volume II: Geniza Documents Concerning Babylonia and Persia at 807, 
Volume III: Geniza Merchants’ Documents at 813 and 814, Volume IV: Geniza 
Merchants’ Documents, at 1, and 479 [in Hebrew].      
 
112 But not exclusively: they could also be used by a traveler who wanted to avoid the risk 
of carrying money as well as for the purpose of  payment to government and donation to 
pious foundations (such as for gifts to the poor). See sources cited in note 102, above. 
 
113  But cf. Goitein above note 104 at 242, as well as AL Udovitch, “Reflections on the 
Institutions of Credits and Banking in the Medieval Islamic Neat East” (1975), 41 Studia 
Islamica 5, at 16 (hereafter, Udovitch, Reflections) and Imamuddin, above note 10 at 29 
and 30 referring to the “bearer” of a suftaj. See also M. Ben-Sasson, The Growth of the 
Jewish Community in the Islamic Lands Qayrawān, 800-1057 (Jerusalem: Magnes, 
1996), at 99 [in Hebrew, free translation of title]. Possibly, they do not use the term in its 
technical legal sense and mean ‘holder’, namely the named payee in possession. In any 
event, Imamuddin, ibid. at 29 n.53 cites a source (AE Sayous, “Observations d’erivains 
du XVe sicele sur les changes et notamment sur l’influence d la disparité du pouvoir 
d’achat des monnaies” 1928 (4) Revue économique International, 289, 293) which in fact 
deals with 13th century documents in Europe. But see Ashtor above note 102 at 563 (and 
557) specifically noting minority of suftaj documents payable to the bearer.  
  
114 See e.g. Goitein, ibid. at 245 and Udovitch, Reflections ibid. at 17. For the view of 
Huvelin, Travaux, above note 5 at 24 ostensibly to the contrary, see note 203 below. For 
the non-transferability of the suftaj as existing regardless of the ‘bearer’ language that it 
may have contained (ibid.), see text around notes 128-129, below. 
 
115 For the modern bill of exchange as an instrument containing an unconditional order to 
pay money, on which the drawee becomes liable upon accepting the order, see e.g. 
English Bills of Exchange Act 1882 (c 61), Section 3(1), in conjunction particularly with 
Sections 17, 23 and 54. 
 
116 For the modern “credit” (namely, a letter of credit) as an “arrangement … that is 
irrevocable and thereby constitutes a definite undertaking of the issuing bank to honour a 




An Islamic payment instrument is not said to incorporate a written formal abstract 
unilateral obligation;117 nor does it require any formality in its execution;118 the payment 
engagement thereon is binding on the paymaster according to its terms as agreed between 
him and the debtor (to whom he owes).119 The operation of the instrument as a payment 
mechanism is premised on the transfer from the debtor to the paymaster, of the debt 
obligation owed (originally by the debtor) to the creditor. Transfer is implemented by 
means of a hawale, as a result of which the paymaster becomes obligated to the creditor. 
As discussed above in §2.2, this means that under the Hanafi rules the paymaster 
becomes liable to the creditor on the debtor’s debt obligation to the creditor; conversely, 
according to the non-Hanafi schools, the paymaster becomes liable to the creditor on the 
paymaster’s own debt obligation to the debtor.  
 
Indeed, by itself, in the broad sense, the hawale is not a distinct type of an Islamic 
payment instrument; rather, in light of the previous discussion, the hawale is the legal 
concept under which such instruments, and even oral agreements, operate as payment 
mechanisms.120 To that end, the term is also used to denote any document or arrangement 
which triggers the application of the hawale. It is a bilateral contract121 of the creditor, 
with the paymaster-transferee under Hanafi law, and with the debtor-transferor according 
to the other schools.  
                                                 
117 As were the Greek chirograph and syngraph. See F. De Zulueta, The Institutes of 
Gaius, Part I: Text with Critical Notes and Translation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946) 
at 195 and Part II: Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), at 166. By way of 
comparison, the stipulatio in Roman law was an oral (and not written) formal abstract 
unilateral obligation. See e.g. Berger, above note 30 at 716; R. W. Lee, The Elements of 
Roman Law, 4th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1956) at 298-304 and B. Nicholas, An 
Introduction to Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962) at 193-196. 
 
118 Even a signature requirement may be bypassed for one whose handwriting on the 
document “was testimony enough to his being the issuer of the order.” See e.g.  Goitein, 
above note 104 at 241. This appears consistent with the restricted circle of those that have 
dealt with such instruments. Cf. text that follow note 12, above. 
 
119 Per general requirements of Islamic contract theory set out in text & notes 130-133, 
below. Most restrictive is Shafi’i law which requires mutual assent to be orally expressed 
in clearly spoken words. Ibid. 
 
120 The term is not mentioned in the Geniza (see Goitein, above note 104 at 460 note 63 
(for text at 241); arguably, this is so since, unlike the ruq’a, sakk and suftaj, the hawale is 
not a distinct category of a payment instrument. And yet it is quite common to refer to the 
hawale as a financial technique, side by side with the other instruments. See e.g. 
Udovitch, Reflections, above note 113 at 10; and Udovitch, Bankers above note 9 at 263.  
 
121 As explained below, this is notwithstanding Rayner who asserts the hawale is a 
unilateral contract. See SE Rayner, The Theory of Contracts in Islamic Law (London; 




 Through the circulation of Islamic payment instruments, the hawale may facilitate 
not only the transfer, from the debtor to the paymaster, of the debt obligation owed 
(originally by the debtor) to the creditor; rather, where needed, it may also facilitate the 
transfer from the creditor to the paymaster, of the debt obligation owed by the creditor to 
his own creditor, and onward in an indefinite chain. In the process, the paymaster’s 
obligation to the debtor, ‘turns’ away from the debtor, first to the creditor, and then 
onward to a subsequent transferee-creditor of each preceding transferor-creditor. The 
hawale thus facilitates the circulation of the paymaster’s obligation on the Islamic 
payment instrument from the hands of each creditor to those of his own creditor.122  
 
Transferability of the entitlement to the debt due from the paymaster, and hence, 
the circulation of Islamic payment instruments, is available under the rules of all schools; 
however, circulation runs more smoothly under the non-Hanafi rules. This is so since the 
latter do not require the paymaster’s consent or agreement for each transfer. Indeed, for 
an effective hawale, all schools require a bilateral rather than trilateral agreement. For the 
Hanafi school, this is however almost a fiction; by nature of things, it is the debtor who is 
interested in the carrying out the hawale; after all, it is the debt he owes, which is to be 
discharged without the actual payment on his own part. A hawale is thus typically 
initiated by the debtor; hence, dispensing with the debtor’s consent or agreement under 
the Hanafi school, does not really simplify the procedure. Conversely, the other schools 
truly bypass the paymaster’s agreement or consent. Thus, in each non-Hanafi school, 
suffice it for a bilateral agreement between the debtor and creditor to carry out a hawale; 
similarly under non-Hanafi rules, a sequence of ensuing bilateral agreements between 
each creditor and his own creditor, creates a hawale chain. In practice, as will be 
elaborated further below, each required bilateral agreement can be reached in conjunction 
with the physical delivery of the instrument reflecting the debt owed by the paymaster to 
the debtor; hence, circulation is easily facilitated under the non-Hanafi schools. 
Conversely, Hanafi rules require the agreement of the paymaster for each transaction; 
certainly, this hinders the circulation of the instruments.123  
 
The predominance of the Maliki rules in Egypt may thus explain the abundance of 
transferable ruq’a and sakk instruments among the Cairo Geniza documents. This 
conclusion is however not irrefutable. Thus, there may not be adequate information on 
the extent and geographical scope of actual circulation of the ruq’a and sakk 
instruments;124 in an environment of a limited circulation, it is possible for the 
                                                 
122 On this point see Huvelin, Travuax above note 5 at 24. Re-delegation is touched upon 
in note 228 & text below. 
 
123 On this point, see Ray, above note 34 at 62-63 and 79-80. 
 
124 In fact, an instrument payable to bearer might indicate the purpose of, namely, the 
underlying transaction for, its issue. Goitein, above note 104 at 241 cites such an 
example, which may be seen as inconsistent with circulation. Certainly however, there 
were also ‘riqā’ sayārif’ payable to bearer serving as ‘banker notes’ which fully 
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instruments to function as payment mechanisms transferring the paymaster’s debt 
obligation from being owed to the debtor to being owed to the creditor, even under 
Hanafi rules, requiring the paymaster’s agreement to confer entitlement on the creditor or 
transferee. In other words, Hanafi rules hinder but not preclude circulation. Moreover, an 
order to pay the ruq’a or sakk could operate as a mere authority to the paymaster to pay 
as well as to the payee to collect, without giving the creditor the benefit of a direct right 
against the paymaster; this will allow the use of the instruments to carry out a non-cash 
payment without even invoking the hawale to explain their operation. 
 
In any event, there may be an alternative, historic rather than analytic, 
explanation, to the circulation of the ruq’a and sakk payable to the bearer. Thus, it is 
noteworthy that ruq’a and sakk payable to the bearer revived an ancient Near Eastern 
practice that had existed prior to the invention of coins, and that did not hit roots in Greek 
or Roman law. Indeed, instruments payable to the bearer go back to Ancient 
Mesopotamia, or more specifically, to as early as to the Old Babylonian Period (2000-
1600 BCE) which included the reign of Hammurabi (1792-1750 BCE). Relevant 
‘instruments’ were clay tables payable in metal or grain. Possibly, the original purpose of 
a bearer clause may have had nothing to do with transferability; rather, the clause was 
inserted on an instrument reflecting a debt owed to temple or palace authorities, for the 
purpose of enabling any, rather than a specific, representative of such authorities to 
collect from the debtor and give him a discharge. Subsequently, however, particularly 
during the Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian Kingdoms (745-539 BCE), the bearer 
clause came to facilitate circulation. While it is contested whether a debt payable to the 
bearer was truly transferable, it is agreed that the obligor was bound by his obligation (or 
acknowledgement of an obligation) to pay to the bearer; that is, a paymaster/obligor 
liable on such an instrument could not lawfully resist making payment to whoever 
presented to him the document containing the bearer clause.125  
  
It is thus possible that the circulation of the ruq’a and sakk payable to the bearer 
was premised on the revival of this old practice rather than on the application of the 
Maliki rules pertaining to the hawale. In other words, it cannot be ruled out that the 
circulation of such paper was based on an ambiguity as to the bearer’s title or claim 
against the paymaster. The bearer’s title or claim could thus be derivative to the 
(debtor’s) claim to enforce the paymaster’s obligation on the basic transaction that had 
                                                                                                                                                 
circulated: Ibid. at 246. For the money changers, called sarrafs serving as ‘bankers’ see 
Section 1 above. 
 
125 Bogaert, Les Origines, above note 8 at 55, 66 73-74, 94-96, 100, as well as 123-124 
and 129. Tablets containing such a clause, are compiled by AH Pruessner, “The Earliest 
Traces of Negotiable Instruments” (1928) 44:2 The American Journal of Semitic 
Languages and Literatures 88, who further attests to the compliance of the instruments he 
examined with other formal requirements of negotiability under modern law, such as 
signature, unconditional promise or order, and certainty as to the time the instrument is 
payable. Certainly, there is nothing to support full negotiability, in the sense of 
transferability free from adverse claims and defences of these tablets.  
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given rise to the issue of the instrument; in such a case, title to the ruq’a or sakk payable 
to the bearer would be transferable. Alternatively, it could be an original title to a claim, 
on the very terms of the paymaster’s obligation, to pay a sum of money to the bearer.  In 
the final analysis, however, either way, there was a system that worked well without 
giving an opportunity for its legal ramification to be ascertained. 
 
It may however be more plausible to see the two explanations as not mutually 
exclusive. Stated otherwise, the revival of an old practice does not negate its 
accommodation by the contemporary legal doctrine. From this perspective, non-Hanafi 
law remains more conducive; certainly, it is the Hanafi rules that are still to be viewed as 
detrimental to the circulation of debt instruments, whether or not they are payable to the 
bearer.  
 
In any event it is noteworthy that even under non-Hanafi rules, transferability by 
delivery of Islamic payment instruments falls short of ‘negotiation’ in a few fundamental 
ways. Thus, in the modern sense of the word, ‘negotiation’ is the transfer of an 
instrument by its holder by means of its delivery, plus, other than for instruments payable 
to the bearer, the endorsement of the holder.126 Transfer by negotiation may confer on a 
transferee a better title than that of the transferor, free of defences of prior parties and 
adverse claims; hence an instrument transferable by negotiation is ‘negotiable’.127  
 
Even under non-Hanafi rules facilitating circulation by delivery, these 
requirements are not met in several respects. First, there is no rule under which the mere 
delivery constitutes a transfer; doctrine requires an agreement between the debtor and the 
creditor. Whether such an agreement can be derived from the mere delivery is another 
matter, dealt with further below. Second, in principle, the mechanism is not limited to 
instruments payable to the bearer. Nor does it necessarily cover all instruments payable to 
bearer. Indeed, the ruq’a and sakk are payable to the bearer, while the suftaj is typically 
payable to a named payee. However, while the former are transferable by delivery and 
the latter is not, there is no indication that this is a matter of legal doctrine relating to the 
identification of the payee, rather than a matter of practice differentiating between types 
of instruments. Stated otherwise, under non-Hanafi rules, there is nothing to preclude the 
transfer of an instrument payable to a named payee by its mere delivery (plus an 
agreement); no predecessor for an endorsement in the form of a signature by the 
transferor is to be found in Islamic legal doctrine.128 Under this reasoning, as will be 
                                                 
126 See for example, in England, Bills of Exchange Act 1882 (c 61). 
127 For the definition of “negotiable instrument” as a document of title to a sum of money, 
transferable by delivery (plus an endorsement as may be necessary) so as possibly to give 
the transferee a complete title, better than that of the transferor, to the document and the 
rights embodied therein, see DV Cowen & L Gering, Cowen The Law of Negotiable 
Instruments in South Africa, 5th ed. Volume I: General Principles (Cape Town: Juta, 
1985) at 52.  
 
128 For the inaccurate use of ‘endorsement’ in relation to the suftaj, see note 226, below. 
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explained further below,129 the non-transferability of the suftaj is a matter of practice 
relating to the function of the suftaj and not to its being an instrument payable to a named 
payee; a suftaj payable to bearer is thus equally not transferable. 
 
Third, there is no indication as to the ability of a transferee of an instrument 
transferable by delivery to obtain a good indefeasible title to it. The entitlement of the 
person to whom the instrument is issued as well as of any subsequent transferee is 
explained under the principles governing the hawale. Hence, instruments transferable by 
delivery were not ‘negotiable’ in the full sense of the term. 
 
 Thus, in the final analysis, under non-Hanafi rules, by reference to the mutual 
assent of the debtor and creditor, transferability by delivery of a debt instrument, creates a 
hawale; that is, it ‘turns’ the paymaster’s obligation away from the debtor onto the 
creditor. In the process, it facilitates the circulation of the aforesaid debt instrument, and 
yet falls short of its negotiation.      
 
§3.2 The suftaj under hawale principles 
 
 This subsection deals with the formation of the bilateral hawale agreement 
underlying the operation of the suftaj. It is this bilateral agreement that facilitates under 
the various Islamic schools the conferment of an entitlement on the creditor. The 
subsection further discuses the function of the suftaj. Ensuing subsections deal with (a) 
the nature of the paymaster’s payment obligation on a suftaj, and his position towards a 
correspondent that may be nominated to pay in the designated place of payment; (b) the 
transferability under a suftaj, from the debtor to the paymaster, of the debt obligation 
owed (originally by the debtor) to the creditor, (c) the non-transferability of the suftaj, 
namely, of the paymaster’s obligation, to the creditor’s own creditor (as well as onward), 
and finally, (d) the objections in Islamic legal doctrine to the very function of the suftaj to 
transmit payment from one place to another.  
  
Islamic contract theory emphasizes mutual consent; to that end, Islamic law “does 
not choose the avenue of formality, beyond requiring that words be exchanged that 
convey, explicitly or implicitly, an unambiguous offer … and acceptance …”130  In 
                                                 
129 See text & notes 202-206, below.   
 
130 FE Vogel, “Contract Law of Islam and the Arab Middle East” Chapter 7 in A. Von 
Mehern (chief ed.) Contracts in General, Volume VII of U. Drobnig and K. Zweight 
(responsible eds.) International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Tübingen: JCB 
Mohr, 2006) at 44. See also GH Bousquet, Précis de Droit Musulman principalement 
malékite et algérien 2. éd. rev., 3. éd. du Précis élémentaire (Alger; la maison des livres, 
1950)  at 256. In detail for the expression of consent in Islamic law, see Y. Linant de 
Bellefonds, Traité de droit musulman comparé Volume I: Thèorie générale de l’acte 
juridique (Paris; Mouton & co., 1965) at 116-156 and MA Hãmid, “Mutual Assent in the 
Formation of Contracts in Islamic Law” (1977), 7 Journal of Islamic and Comparative 
Law 41. The various elements of ‘consent’, though technically only in connection with a 
contract for sale, are also discussed by Rayner, above note 121 at 105-121. 
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applying this principle, most restrictive is Shafi’i law which requires mutual assent to be 
orally expressed in clearly spoken words.131 At the same time, as long as assent is 
unambiguously expressed, the other schools are satisfied with both written and oral 
contracts, agreed explicitly or implicitly. For all schools, it is normally required that the 
offer and acceptance are to be exchanged between the parties in the same meeting or 
session; stated otherwise, both are usually expected to be present together at the time the 
contract is concluded.132 Nothing however precludes a contract from being reached 
between distant parties on the basis of an exchange of unambiguous messages between 
them, and the use of messengers to convey such messages. Messages exchanged between 
parties who are away from each other may be oral; other than under Shafi’i law, 
messages could also be communicated exclusively in writing.133
 
According to Ray, in contrast to their Hanafi counterparts, Maliki rules134 
facilitate the use of hawale to transmit funds from place to place. As he explains, under 
Maliki law, a debtor owed by a paymaster who is situated in one place and who wishes to 
pay a creditor located in another place, “can transmit [the paymaster’s] recognisance of 
debt to [the creditor]”, thereby causing the paymaster to become liable to the creditor. 
This, however, does not work under Hanafi law that requires the presence of the 
paymaster.135   
 
Indeed, for a hawale to work, Hanafi law requires the paymaster’s agreement: 
such an agreement may be expressed orally, and according to one view, may even be 
derived from the paymaster’s silence.136 At the same time, other than under Hanafi law, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
131 Linant de Bellefonds, ibid. at 136-137: and Vogel, ibid. at 32 and 44. 
 
132 See e.g.  Schacht, Introduction, above note 21 at 145, according to whom, in Islamic 
law, “The contract is a bilateral transaction, and it requires an offer … and an 
acceptance…, both made normally in the same meeting … of the contracting parties”.  
Other than under the Maliki school (Linant de Bellefonds, ibid. at 155), an offer may be 
withdrawn until accepted (Schacht, ibid.); according to one view, both offer and 
acceptance can respectively be withdrawn as long as the contractual session has not been 
terminated. See Coulson, above note 1 at 46, Vogel, ibid. at 44. For the contractual 
session see also Chehata, above note 21 at 117-118. 
 
133 In general, rules that govern the ‘contractual session’ apply with the necessary 
modifications to the case where the parties are not present together. See Linant de 
Bellefonds, ibid. at 154-155. 
 
134 In fact this would be the case for all other, namely, non-Hanafi schools. 
 
135 Ray, above note 34 at 62.  
 
136 MD Santillana, Code civil et commercial tunisien avant-projet discuté et adopté 
(Tunis: Imprimerie générale, 1899), note on Article 2011 at 704. 
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an agreement reached between the debtor and creditor suffices to establish a hawale.137 
However, under the non-Hanafi schools, the formation of a hawale by means of the 
delivery by the debtor to the creditor of the paymaster’s acknowledgement of debt owed 
by the paymaster to the debtor, as claimed by Ray, requires some analysis. As explained 
immediately below, the delivery by the debtor to the creditor of the paymaster’s 
acknowledgement of debt is not a unilateral contract; nor, as was already noted, is it a 
‘negotiation’ constituting a transfer of a debt by the mere physical delivery of the debt 
document. Rather, it can lead to a bilateral contract to be created by the exchange of an 
offer and acceptance.  
 
First, the hawale is not a unilateral contract. Indeed, it is true that in principle, 
both the discharge of a debtor138 and the acknowledgement of a debt139 may operate as 
unilateral contracts.140 As such they may be created by the mere transmittal or delivery of 
a document by one party to another; it is however the creditor who is to transmit a 
discharge and the debtor who is to transmit an acknowledgement. Hawale based on the 
delivery of an acknowledgment results in the discharge of the debtor;141 nevertheless, in a 
hawale, it is the debtor who delivers the document to the creditor rather than the other 
way around. This cannot operate as a discharge for the debtor. As well, while the 
transmittal of the document by the debtor results in the discharge of the paymaster 
towards the debtor, it further results in positioning the paymaster as owing to the creditor; 
to speak of the hawale as resulting in the paymaster’s discharge is thus an incomplete, 
and hence, inadvertently potentially misleading, description of its features. Moreover, the 
acknowledgement the debtor delivers to the creditor is not of a debt owed by the debtor to 
the creditor, confirming the debtor’s liability to the creditor; rather, it is an 
acknowledgement by the paymaster of a debt owed by the paymaster to the debtor, which 
is said to create a debt owed by the paymaster to the creditor (and discharging the debtor 
on his debt to the creditor). For all these reasons, the hawale cannot be rationalized as a 
unilateral contract.   
 
                                                 
137 For the differences among the various schools, particularly between Hanafi and non-
Hanafi law, see §2.2 above. 
 
138 For the acquittal of a debtor as a “unilateral disposition … with immediate legal effect” 
see Schacht, Introduction, above note 21 at 145.  
 
139 For the ‘acknowledgement’ as a unilateral “disadvantageous transaction” see Schacht, 
ibid. at 151. See also ibid. at 144. 
 
140 But cf. Linant de Bellefonds above note 130 at 166-168, particularly questioning 
whether the remittance or cancellation of a debt (‘remise de dette’) does not require the 
acceptance by the debtor. 
 
141 Cf. Schacht, Introduction, above note 21 at 148 who speaks of the hawela as a “way of 
extinguishing an obligation … by transforming it into a new one … ” 
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Second, the hawale is not created by “negotiation”. As indicated,142 it is certainly 
premature to view the paymaster’s debt document as endowed with the attributes of 
negotiability. Treating the mere physical transfer of the document as adequate to transfer 
the debt claim would be to confer on the debt instrument an important attribute of 
negotiability. Effectively viewing the delivery of the debt document as ‘negotiation’ thus 
strikes me as anachronism, inappropriate in terms of contemporary legal doctrine.  
 
At the same time, in the footsteps of Ray,143 I see how the transmittal by the 
debtor to the creditor of the paymaster’s recognizance of debt may lead to the formation 
of a hawale. However, in my view, it is not the delivery on its own which unilaterally 
creates the contract. Rather, as indicated, a bilateral contract is created upon the creditor’s 
acceptance of the debtor’s offer embodied in the debtor’s message which accompanies 
the paymaster’s debt document. Such acceptance is to be manifested but not necessarily 
communicated, and certainly not to the debtor himself; indeed, “The necessity for the 
communication of the offer and the acceptance appears to have played a very little part in 
the Islamic law scheme of contracting.”144 What is required is the expression of mutual 
assent, and not necessarily its communication; it is enough for the parties to express their 
assent in the presence of each other at the meeting place.145 Hence, there is no difficulty 
in finding mutual assent where delivery of the debt document occurs face-to-face. By the 
same token, in the case of a contract between distant parties, the offeror’s messenger is to 
be treated as “a conduit pipe for conveying the words of the offeror”,146 in which case, 
suffice it for the offeree’s acceptance is to be manifested at the meeting place between the 
offeror’s messenger and the offeree.  
 
Thus, “the rule in all schools” appears to be that “when the parties are contracting 
inter absentes, the acceptance need not be communicated. The contract is complete as 
soon as the offeree declares his acceptance.”147  In principle, other than under Shafi’i law, 
the creditor’s acceptance may be manifested by his mere silence in receiving the 
paymaster’s debt recognizance,148 that is, by not rejecting it within a reasonable time 
                                                 
 
142 See discussion at the end of §3.1, above.  
 
143 Above, text that follows note 137. 
 
144 Hãmid, above note 130 at 47.  
 
145 This is a principal theme throughout Hãmid’s article, ibid. 
 
146 Ibid. at 51.  
 
147 Ibid. at 52. 
 




after receipt.149 In the final analysis however, under non-Hanafi law, the exchange of 
messages between the debtor and creditor may evolve around the delivery by the debtor 
of the paymaster’s debt document followed by the expression of its acceptance by the 
creditor; it is this chain of events which creates the hawale as a bilateral contract between 
the debtor and creditor.  
 
Indeed, as a matter of Islamic legal doctrine, under non-Hanafi law, an agreement 
reached between the debtor and the creditor is effective to compel the paymaster to pay 
the creditor rather than the debtor. As already indicated, the theory behind this rule is the 
indifference of the paymaster as to the identity of the payee who is to discharge him on 
his payment obligation.150 This rationale sets the limits of rule; the debtor-creditor 
agreement is obviously ineffective to modify otherwise the terms of the paymaster’s 
payment obligation. In our context, such an agreement to which the paymaster is not a 
party is incapable of requiring him to change the place of payment,151 and thereby 
effectively assume the risk of carrying the money from the debtor’s location to that of the 
creditor.  
 
 Accordingly, under non-Hanafi law, the consent of the paymaster can be bypassed 
only where as a result of the hawale the paymaster is to pay the creditor at the location 
originally designated for payment for the paymaster’s obligation to the debtor. This 
means that even under non-Hanafi law a creditor located in a place152 different from that 
of the debtor will benefit from a hawale agreed without the consent of the paymaster only 
under narrow circumstances. A case to the point is where as a result of the hawale the 
paymaster who originally agreed to pay the debtor at the debtor’s place is to pay at the 
same place to an agent duly appointed by the creditor.153 Another case is in which the 
paymaster originally agreed with the debtor to pay at the creditor’s location.154 Risk of 
                                                 
149 For the reasonable time available for acceptance by the recipient of a message 
containing an offer see Linant de Bellefonds ibid. at 155. 
 
150 See text that follows paragraph containing notes 40-41, above. 
 
151 Discussion does not deal with de minimis changes that are unlikely to change risk 
materially; rather, it assumes significant change of location.  
 
152 As immediately above, ‘different’ or ‘designated’  (as well as ‘same’) ‘location’ or 
‘place’ is broadly used by reference to a ‘city’, or any other venue which respectively 
does or does not materially change the risk assumed by the paymaster in the payment 
obligation he incurred to the debtor.  
 
153 More broadly, such a case is whenever payment is to be made at a place other than of 
the creditor; it would not matter if it is the debtor’s place or anywhere else. 
 
154 A similar case will be where the paymaster, who is in business also in the creditor’s 
location, agreed to pay wherever a proper demand is presented to him. 
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money-transport is fastened on the creditor in the former case and is left with the debtor 
in the latter; either way, the risk incurred by the paymaster has not been altered.   
 
 In the final analysis, to require the paymaster to pay the creditor in a place 
different from the one designated in the paymaster’s contract with the debtor, the 
paymaster’s agreement or consent is required under both Hanafi and non-Hanafi law. 
Under Hanafi law, the paymaster’s agreement is required to effectuate the hawale; under 
the other schools, the paymaster’s consent is required to effectuate the modification in the 
terms of his original payment obligation. It is only where there is no change in the place 
in which the paymaster is to pay, that is, where no modification in the terms of his 
original payment obligation is involved, that non-Hanafi rules do not require an 
additional agreement by the paymaster and hence benefit the creditor more than Hanafi 
law.  
 
Thus, under non-Hanafi law, the paymaster’s consent in his original agreement 
with the debtor can benefit the creditor who has concluded the hawale agreement with the 
debtor. At the same time, under Hanafi law, a creditor wishing to enforce the paymaster’s 
payment undertaking contained in the paymaster’s agreement with the debtor, must 
subsequently reach a separate agreement with the paymaster, even where the terms of that 
agreement are identical to those of the earlier agreement between the paymaster and the 
debtor. This is so since under Hanafi law, the hawale, without which the creditor is not 
entitled to receive payment from the paymaster, is to be formed by an agreement reached 
between the paymaster and the creditor.  
 
In sum, the paymaster’s engagement under his contract with the debtor to pay him 
in a place other than that of the debtor can be transferred and become owed to a creditor 
located in the designated place of payment. This may be accomplished according to all 
schools, by means of a hawale; the hawale requires an additional, in fact confirming, 
agreement of the paymaster, under Hanafi rules, but not otherwise. It is from this 
perspective that the use of hawale to transmit payment between a distant debtor and 
creditor is more practical under non-Hanafi law.155
 
Certainly, this distinction between the Hanafi and the other laws is important in an 
environment in which documents of debts circulate, namely, are intended to pass freely 
from the hands of the creditor to a transferee, and onwards to an indefinite chain of 
subsequent transferees. In such an environment, seeking each time the paymaster’s 
consent, as required under Hanafi law and dispensed with by the other rites, is tantamount 
to a nuisance, which depending on the circumstances of a given case, may become an 
obstacle. However, the significance of that distinction is not to be overstated in an 
environment which does not purport to facilitate the movement of a debt document 
beyond the hands of the original creditor; a paymaster who agreed with the debtor to pay 
                                                 
155 With respect, this limitation, to the case in which the paymaster’s engagement under 
his contract with the debtor is to pay him in a place other than that of the debtor, seems to 
be overlooked by Ray, who above note 34 at 65, notes that the use of hawale to transmit 
payment between a distant debtor and creditor is more practical under non-Hanafi law. 
 
 43
in a place other than that of the debtor may anyway be easily disposed to reconfirm his 
agreement to the creditor, as required under Hanafi law and dispensed with under the 
other schools. The crucial step is the initial agreement to pay other than at the debtor’s 
place, a step that as indicated is by no means bypassed in non-Hanafi law. 
 
 A paymaster is likely to agree to pay other than at the debtor’s place where the 
paymaster’s debt arises in the first place with the view of transmitting payment from 
place to place, whether as a primary objective or an incidental feature of the transaction. 
To that end the suftaj developed to achieve the binding agreement of the paymaster to 
pay in a location other than that of the transaction that gave rise to the paymaster’s 
obligation to the debtor. Indeed, in a hawlae, the paymaster may be, and other than 
Hanafi law, must be, indebted to the debtor; the debt thus owed by the paymaster is 
preexisting, and has not been created a part of the hawale transaction. At the same time, 
in a suftaj, the paymaster must owe money to the debtor; such debt is however owed 
under a transaction created under the suftaj transaction, specifically with the view of 
making repayment elsewhere.156 The delivery of money to the paymaster with the view 
of transmitting its sum to another destination is often referred to as ‘remittance’, in which 
case, the person delivering the money to the paymaster is the ‘remitter’. 
 
Repayment by the paymaster of the sum received under the suftaj is to be made in 
a place designated under the suftaj which is different from the place where the paymaster 
received the equivalent sum of money. As provided in the suftaj, repayment may be to 
the remitter, who delivered the money to the paymaster (and thus became his creditor). 
Alternatively, repayment by the paymaster may be stated to be made in the designated 
place to another person nominated by the remitter. Thus, the suftaj does not necessarily 
entail the transfer of the obligation to pay so as to invoke hawale principles. Stated 
otherwise, the distinctive feature of the suftaj is the repayment of a debt in a place other 
than of the original debt transaction, and not necessarily to a different party.  
 
Where the designated payee is the remitter himself the suftaj serves as an 
equivalent of the modern traveler’s cheque157 or its predecessor, the traveler’s letter of 
credit;158 thereunder, a traveler forgoes the risk of carrying cash with him by delivering 
money to a paymaster at the place where the travel commences and arranging (with the 
paymaster) to have the equivalent sum made available to him (the remitter/traveler) at the 
place of destination. A payee other than the remitter may be a donee or a creditor of the 
                                                 
156 See e.g. Schacht, Introduction, above note 21 at 149.  
 
157 For the traveler’s cheque see e.g. HG Beale (General Editor), Chitty on Contracts, 29th 
ed. Volume II: Specific Contracts (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) at ¶¶34-174 to 185, 
pp. 333-338.  
 
158 Traveler’s letter of credit is defined eg. in BA Garner (ed. in chief), Black’s Law 
Dictionary, 8th ed. (St. Paul, Minn: Thomson West, 2004) at 924. Such letters of credit 
are “in the nature of traveler’s checks”. See JF Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit, 4th ed 
(Austin, Tx: AS Pratt & Sons, 2007) at ¶3.02, p. 3-6 n.28.  
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remitter. A suftaj payable to a person other than the remitter is thus functionally the 
forerunner of the commercial bill of exchange, with which the remitter is to pay his debt 
to a distant creditor without physically carrying the money from place to place.159 A 
suftaj payable to a person other than the remitter may also be used to fulfill a function of 
the modern commercial letter of credit, under which a designated payee would not release 
goods to be sold to the remitter other than against the paymaster’s obligation to pay for 
them.160
 
Certainly, the suftaj payable to a payee other than the remitter falls short of 
fulfilling all the functions of its above-mentioned successors. Particularly, unlike the 
early Medieval Continental bill of exchange, the suftaj is payable in the same currency as 
the one given by the remitter to the paymaster;161 it involves no currency exchange 
element.162 As well, unlike the documentary letter of credit, the suftaj provides no 
protection to the remitter; it anticipates payment on the payee’s demand with no 
mechanism to ensure that he fulfilled his part of the contract.163 As such, the suftaj 
payable to a payee designated by the remitter is a payment mechanism pure and simple, 
used for payment between distant parties, usually, a debtor and creditor. Being 
unconditionally payable upon presentment, it is thus more akin to the bill of exchange 
than to the commercial letter of credit.164   
 
§3.3 The legal nature and operation of the suftaj 
 
                                                 
159 For the modern bill of exchange, see note 115, above. 
 
160 For the modern letter of credit, see note 116, above. 
 
161 In contrast, currency exchange was at the heart of the early bill of exchange transaction 
in Continental Europe. See e.g. MT Boyer-Xambeu, G Deleplace, and L Gillard, Private 
Money & Public Currencies – the 16th Century Challenge (Armonk NY and London, 
England: ME Shape, 1994; translated by A Azodi) at 25-35.   
 
162 Ashtor, above note 102 at 562-565 enumerates three grounds on which the suftaj is 
distinguished from the bill of exchange: currency, number of participants, and availability 
of endorsements. Among these three points, the second is dubious. As for lack of 
endorsements, see text and notes 126-129 above, as well as text and notes 202-206 and 
226 below. 
 
163 In contrast, the commercial letter of credit requires payment to the beneficiary 
(creditor) only against documents strictly complying with specifications laid out by the 
applicant (debtor). The classic authority on this point is J.H Rayner v. Hambro’s Bank 
[1943] KB 37, 40.  
 
164 For the bill of exchange in modern law, as an unconditional order of payment, payable 
upon the (usually) physical presentation of the instrument, see e.g. the English Bills of 
Exchange Act 1882 (c 61) Sections 3(1) in conjunction with 45 and 52(4). 
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The analysis of the legal nature of the suftaj is designed to provide answers to 
three key questions. The first is the nature of the paymaster’s obligation and his position 
towards a correspondent that may be nominated to pay in the designated place of 
payment. This question comes up whether or not this obligation is stated to be payable to 
the remitter or to a payee designated by him. With regard to a suftaj payable to a payee 
other than the remitter, a second question arises, that is, as to the redirection of the 
paymaster’s obligation from being owed to the remitter to being owed to the payee. 
Finally, the third question is as to the non-transferability of the suftaj.  
 
So far as the first question is concerned, the paymaster’s obligation is classified 
under Islamic law as that of a borrower; that is, under all schools of Islamic law, the 
suftaj gives rise to a loan repayable in a place different from that of the loan.165 The loan 
is constituted by the delivery of the money by the remitter to the paymaster who agrees to 
repay an equivalent sum in the same currency, at the designated location, to the 
designated person, the latter being the remitter himself or someone nominated by him. 
The paymaster expresses his agreement by placing his signature on the suftaj document.  
 
The suftaj is thus a document reflecting a borrower’s undertaking to repay a 
monetary loan in the currency of the loan,166 to a payee usually identified in the 
document, and who is to present it and obtain payment in a designated place other than 
the place of the loan. The designated payee could either be the original lender or his 
nominee. A designated nominee could well be the lender’s own creditor. In the scenario 
on which the present discussion focuses, the debtor (in the transaction to be paid by 
suftaj) is the  lender (to whom the suftaj is issued), the paymaster (suftaj issuer) is the 
borrower, and the designated payee is the creditor (in the transaction to be paid by suftaj); 
the debtor ‘lends’ the paymaster money to be repaid by the paymaster (‘borrower’) to the 
creditor in discharge not only of the ‘loan’ made to the paymaster by the debtor, but also 
of a debt owed by the debtor to the creditor, and incurred prior to and irrespective of, the 
suftaj.  
       
 As a rule, a suftaj was issued by a paymaster of high repute;167 it entailed a high 
commission168 and was hard to get.169 The operation of the suftaj system is premised on 
                                                 
165 See e.g. Schacht, Introduction, above note 21 at 149, defining the suftaj as “a loan of 
money in order to avoid the risk of transport.”  See further, §3.4 below. 
 
166 I suppose that the identity between the currency of the loan and of its repayment was a 
matter of practice rather than a requirement derived from any legal doctrine. 
 
167 The point is highlighted by Goitein above note 104 at 242-243, who goes on to say that 
otherwise, in the Geniza documents, “Payment though a third party in another city fell 
under the general category of transfer of debt” and was not treated as a suftaj. However, 
for the purpose of our discussion, no such distinction is to be made.  
 
168 For questioning the conformity of the practice with the prohibition to take interest see 
Ray, above note 34 at 77. Regardless, presumably, the commission was waived for small 
amounts sent for charity. See Goitein, ibid. at 244.  
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the presence of the paymaster or his correspondent in each of the places, that of the 
debtor and that of the creditor.170 That is, the paymaster may be a large merchant who 
operates in both places. He takes the money in one place and returns an equivalent sum in 
another without physically carrying it from place to place. In other words, he uses the 
borrowed money at the place of the loan, and repays it out of money available to him at 
the place of the repayment. He may act as a single intermediary in an operation which 
may thus be a tripartite arrangement.  
 
Alternatively, the paymaster, located at the place of the loan, may employ an 
agent or business associate, such as another merchant with whom he has ongoing 
dealings, as a correspondent, who is to make the payment to the payee, at the designated 
place of payment. In the absence of an institutionalized mechanism for settlement 
between the paymaster and his correspondent, they are to settle in the course of a mutual 
business relationship, giving rise to reciprocal debts, created not necessarily exclusively 
from the transmission of payments for third parties.171  
 
It has been attempted to explain legal relations under the suftaj in the framework 
of the qirâd. The qirâd is a Maliki term for a bilateral arrangement under which one party 
(owner or mâlik) invests capital and another (âmil) manages or trades with it on the 
understanding that they share the profit, but not the loss; rather, any loss resulting from a 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
169 A fact that contributed to the continued parallel practice of sending purses of money 
from place to place. See e.g. Goitein, ibid. at 244.  
 
170 Ashtor, above note 102 at 556, 563 and 566 points out that most documentation refers 
to the suftaj as a three-party arrangement. Yet it is not always clear whether the party to 
be deleted is the creditor (in which case the suftaj is payable to the debtor) or the 
correspondent (in which case it is payable to the creditor by the paymaster). In fact, there 
is nothing to preclude the possibility of a two-party suftaj payable by the paymaster to the 
debtor, obviously at a place other than where the money was ‘lent’ by the latter to the 
former.   
 
171 Generally speaking, in this respect, the financial system in the Islamic lands did not go 
further than its predecessors in Ancient Greece (See: R. Bogaert, Banques et banquiers 
dans les cités grecques (Leyde: A.W. Sijthoff, 1968) at 344-345 and 413.), Ancient Rome 
(See: J. Andreau, Banking and Business in the Roman World, translated by J. Lloyd 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 43, notwithstanding Maxwell, above 
note 65 at 111 to the contrary) as well as Greco-Roman Egypt (See: R. Bogaert, “Les 
opérations des banques de l’ Égypte Ptolémaïque” (1998), 29 Ancient Society 49 at 135), 
none of which institutionalized any mechanism for the  multilateral clearing and 
settlement; the latter is traced to 12th century medieval fairs in Europe. See P. Huvelin, 
Essai historique sur le droit des marchés & des foires (Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1897) at 
534, 552-577.  
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normal activity is borne by the owner.172 Unfortunately however, as will be seen 
immediately below, as a framework of enhancing the understanding of the suftaj, qirâd 
analysis has been confusing and not particularly helpful. 
 
Thus, the Hedya discusses the situation in which the managing partner (âmil) in a 
qirâd becomes liable on a suftaj he issues to a third party outside of the qirâd venture.173 
In such a case the investing partner (mâlik) is said to become jointly liable with the 
managing partner (âmil) to the third party for the amount ‘borrowed’ under the suftaj 
only upon ratification by the investing partner.174 Grasshoff discusses this Hedya text.175 
                                                 
172 See e.g. definition by AL Udovitch, “Credit as a Means of Investment in Medieval 
Islamic Trade” (1967), 87 Journal of American Oriental Society, 260, 261 n.12 
[hereafter: Udovitch, Credit]. In fact, qirâd, or its equivalent, muqãrada is used by both 
the Maliki and Shafi’i schools. In Hanafi terminology this arrangement is called 
mudãraba. Ibid. Briefly, the qirâd works as follows: suppose the investor provides the 
managing partner with $100 capital. Where the latter works it to produce $20 profit, this 
profit is shared between the parties (in an agreed upon ratio) and the $100 investment is 
returned to the investor. Conversely, where as a result of normal trading by the managing 
partner the capital shrank to $80, the investor takes back this amount (so that the entire 
financial loss falls on him); the managing partner’s loss is limited to his wasted time and 
effort. The qirâd is said to be the forerunner of the Medieval European commenda. See 
AL Udovitch, “At the Origins of the Western Commenda: Islam, Israel, Byzantium?” 
(1962), 37 (2) Speculum, 198, particularly at 207 (hereafter: Udovitch, Commenda).   
 
173 Hedya, above note 28 at 466, discussing the mozaribat, defined at 454 in terms of a 
qirâd. 
 
174 For the amount borrowed on the suftaj the two qirâd partners become parties to a 
credit partnership (sharikat al-wujūh), and thus jointly liable. Ibid. According to 
Udovitch, "Credit partnership (sharikat al-wujūh) ... is simply an arrangement in which 
the capital of the parties consists not of their own cash or merchandise, but of credit 
either in the form of a loan or of purchases of goods for which payment was deferred." 
AL Udovitch, “Theory and Practice of Islamic Law: Some Evidence from the Geniza” 
(1970), 32 Studia Islamica, 289 at 299-300 (hereafter: Udovitch, Theory). The 'sharikat 
al-wujūh' was also known as "the partnership of those with good reputations", in which 
the partners invested in credit. See Udovitch, Credit, above note 172 at 262.  Between the 
partners, both liability and profit must correspond to the investment.  
 
175 R. Grasshoff, Das Wechsel Recht der Araber (Berlin: Verlag von Otto Liebman, 1899) 
at 24-25 [in German. I relied on an unofficial translation]. It should be noted that the 
Hedya, ibid. appears to speak of two alternative scenarios; one of the giving and the other 
of taking of the suftaj by the managing party. This ambiguity reappears in Grasshoff’s 
passage, ibid. as well. On his own, Grasshoff can thus be alternatively understood to say 
that an âmil under a qirâd who outside the qirâd venture lends and takes a suftaj from a 
third party paymaster cannot bind the mâlik who is to become bound and thus effectively 
liable to the âmil jointly with the third party paymaster (suftaj issuer) only upon the 
mâlik’s ratification. In any event, the Hedya, ibid. (on which Grasshoff relies) specifically 
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Huvelin understands Grasshoff to analyze the qirâd as governing in a suftaj the 
relationship between the paymaster and his correspondent where they have an ongoing 
business relationship.176 Huvelin draws from the application of this qirâd framework to 
the suftaj two implications. First, in his view, the qirâd relationship explains the liability 
of the correspondent to the paymaster.177 Second, according to him, the qirâd relationship 
explains the joint liability of the paymaster and his correspondent to the third party 
creditor, and hence the recourse of the third-party creditor against the paymaster in case 
of non-payment by the correspondent.178  
 
Elsewhere, Grasshoff speaks of a situation in which the investing partner in a 
qirâd requests the managing partner to return the invested capital plus his (the investing 
partner’s) share in the profit to another location by means of a suftaj.179 In such a case, 
the qirâd mâlik is the suftaj lender (i.e. the debtor in our generic paradigm), while the 
qirâd âmil is the suftaj paymaster (i.e. the borrower under the suftaj and its issuer). 
Remde may have understood Grashoff to say that under such circumstances the risk 
under the suftaj is allocated by the law applicable to a qirâd.180 Remde thus appears to 
interpret Grashoff as arguing that the qirâd relationship continues to govern the 
suftaj.181Under this interpretation, per rules applicable to the qirâd, the risk of loss of the 
suftaj money falls on the suftaj lender (the debtor in our generic paradigm), acting as the 
qirâd mâlik, the party who used the suftaj in the first place to avoid that risk.  
 
Charging the suftaj lender (i.e. the debtor in our generic paradigm) with the risk of 
loss, per Remde’s interpretation of Grasshoff, is obviously contrary to principle. Thus, 
disagreeing with what he appears to understand Grasshoff to say, Remde suggests that in 
                                                                                                                                                 
speaks of a sharikat al-wujūh between the âmil /paymaster and the mâlik which excludes 
this alternative understanding from Grasshoff. 
 
176 Huvelin, Travaux, above note 5 at 23-24. And yet, in the footsteps of the Hedya, 
Grasshoff does not even treat the correspondent as a party to the qirâd arrangement. Ibid.   
 




179 Grasshoff, above note 175 at 29. 
 
180 A. Remde, Lettera di cambio und Suftadja Eine rechtsvergleichende Studie als Beitrag 
zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Wechsels (Köln: Inaugural-Dissertation, 1969) at 88 [in 
German. I relied on an unofficial translation]. 
 
181 Unfortunately, he is quite vague on this point. He is saying, however, that “[w]ere the 
qirâd to be regarded as the cause [of the suftaj], then the âmil must be the issuer of the 
suftadja and the issuance of the suftadja occurs against the commitment of the qirâd “ 
Ibid. at 88.  The interpretation proposed in the text above is consistent with Remde’s 
ensuing critique.  
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the course of the transmission of funds under a suftaj a qirâd could nevertheless be 
constructed, and yet, only between the paymaster and his correspondent;182 he thus 
assigns the role of the qirâd investor (mâlik) to the paymaster, who is indeed to bear the 
loss by reimbursing his qirâd managing partner (âmil), the suftaj correspondent.183 From 
this perspective, the added value of the qirâd analysis to our understanding of the suftaj is 
however, rather limited; it only strengthens the correspondent’s claim for recourse against 
the paymaster. As well, possibly,184 under non-Hanafi rules, recourse of the 
correspondent against the paymaster on a qirâd provides a legal basis for the operation of 
the suftaj even where the paymaster does not owe in advance to the correspondent,185 
other than as the qirâd investor.    
 
It seems to me that both Huvelin and Remde read too much into Grasshoff and 
thus misinterpret him; I do not understand Grasshoff to analyze any aspect of the suftaj as 
a qirâd relationship; rather, he only deals with the suftaj in two separate situations in 
which a qirâd pre-exits the suftaj. In the first case he deals with the liability of the 
investing party for the amount of a suftaj issued by his managing partner. In the second 
case he discusses the use of the suftaj to transfer the qirâd investment and profit share of 
the investing partner to another location. In the former case the ratifying mâlik becomes 
liable under the law applicable to qirâd; in the latter, the relationship under a suftaj issued 
by the âmil to the mâlik is nevertheless governed by the law applicable to suftaj; being 
the suftaj issuer, it is thus the former who bears the risk of loss of the suftaj money, 
exactly as if he were a stranger to whom the qirâd investor (mâlik) gave the money he 
just received from the qirâd âmil at the termination of the qirâd. In neither case the law 
of qirâd is superimposed on and supercedes the law of suftaj. 
  
A suftaj is usually drafted to be payable on demand; it may be properly 
authenticated so as to be easily provable186 and may further be drafted to impose heavy 
                                                 
182 Remde is unclear as to whether his analysis is limited to the case of a suftaj issued by 
an âmil to transmit payment owed to an investor (mâlik) under a qirâd. If so, Remde is to 
be understood as saying that the âmil in the qirâd whose principal amount and 
(investor’s) share in profit is to be transmitted by means of a suftaj, becomes the mâlik in 
the qirâd under which the suftaj is carried out. 
 
183 For the mâlik’s obligation to reimburse the âmil in a qirâd arrangement see text & note 
172, above. For the paymaster’s obligation to reimburse the correspondent under a suftaj, 
see text & note 171, above.  
 
184 The hesitation stems from the fact that a qirâd appears to require actual advance on the 
part on the investor/owner (paymaster) (and not merely an undertaking to invest), in 
which case there is anyway a debt owed to him by the managing partner (correspondent).  
 
185 For the indebtedness requirement under non-Hanafi rules, see text that follows 
paragraph containing note 42, above.   
 
186 For the suftaj as instrument, see Grasshoff, above note 175 at 30-34. 
 
 50
penalties for any delay in payment.187 Payment on a suftaj, namely, repayment of the loan 
that gave rise to it, whether by the paymaster or his correspondent, is typically made 
against its proper presentment by the payee at the place designated for payment.188 Thus, 
a remitter is likely to carry with him a suftaj payable to himself and to send to the creditor 
a suftaj of which that creditor is the payee. And yet, the entitlement to enforce the 
paymaster’s obligation on the suftaj is not on the basis of possession by the named payee; 
from a legal perspective, the paymaster-borrower is bound under the suftaj to the debtor-
lender, even where the repayment obligation is to be discharged by payment to the third 
party-creditor; the paymaster’s engagement on the suftaj does not inure to the benefit of 
the creditor, who thus, as a matter of a strict legal doctrine, is not entitled to enforce it. 
Rather, the engagement is enforceable exclusively by the debtor (‘lender’) to whose 
benefit the paymaster’s obligation inures. This takes us to the second aforesaid 
question189 relating to the legal underpinning of the suftaj, namely, to the redirection of 
the paymaster’s obligation from being owed to the debtor-‘lender’, to being owed to the 
payee-creditor.   
 
Indeed, on his part, the creditor may wish to have a direct right against the 
paymaster: this is particularly so when the creditor obtains the suftaj before its stated due 
date,190 before he is entitled to payment under his contract with the debtor, or else, where 
he is either prepared to give the paymaster an extension, wishes to be paid on it in 
installments,191 or seeks to enforce payment against the paymaster. To all such ends, the 
creditor may be given a direct right against the paymaster by means of a hawale. 
Certainly, according to the non-Hanafi schools, a hawale may be established without the 
consent of the paymaster, by the bilateral agreement of the debtor and the creditor. In the 
footsteps of Ray and as explained above, this can be achieved by the creditor’s 
                                                 
187 See e.g. Udovitch, Reflections, above note 113 at 16. Goitein above note 104 at 243 is 
to the same effect; at 245 he even mentions the possibility of a paymaster making 
advances on a forthcoming suftaj prior to its arrival.  For questioning the validity of the 
penalty clauses as possible violation of the prohibition to take interest, see Ray, above 
note 34 at 77.  
 
188 According to Imamuddin, above note 10 at 29, “Each suftajah had its own time limit 
which was generally forty days”; it must thus be presented prior to expiry date.  
 
189 For the enumeration of key questions, see above, first paragraph in §3.3. 
 
190 For such suftajs see e.g. Ashtor, above note 102 at 557 n. 31. The text on which Ashtor 
relies, At-Tanūkhī, Revue de l’Académie Arabe, 678 at 680 [in Arabic], is a literary text 
speaking of a suftaj presented on due date, and on which payment was requested by its 
beneficiary who presented it to be made in installments. I relied on an unofficial 
translation.  
 
191 The practice, noted by Imamuddin, above note 10 at 30 (as well as by At-Tanūkhī, 
ibid.), “is not mentioned in legal works”. Ray, above note 34 at 71. 
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acceptance from the debtor of the paymaster’s recognizance of indebtedness.192 And yet, 
as explained, for this to work, the paymaster’s recognizance of debt must have expressed 
an obligation to pay other than in a place of the loan, and would thus normally be on a 
suftaj.193  
 
At the same time, under Hanafi law, the hawale, giving the creditor a direct right 
against the paymaster on the suftaj, requires the agreement of the paymaster, effectively 
confirming to the creditor, and thus inuring to his benefit, the paymaster’s early 
agreement on the suftaj.  Indeed, it may be arguable that the transmittal to the creditor of 
the suftaj document with the consent of the paymaster may be viewed as a confirmation 
to the creditor of the paymaster’s undertaking and hence constitutes his agreement with 
the creditor;194 but even then the creditor is likely to insist on being presented with a 
tangible evidence as to the paymaster’s consent.  
 
In any event, according to all Islamic schools, it is thus the hawale, with the full 
implications and incidents, as discussed in §2.2 above, that ‘perfects’ the creditor’s right 
to be paid on the suftaj. Accordingly, in the case of default by the paymaster, both major 
schools, the Hanafi and Maliki, usually do not permit the recourse by the creditor against 
the debtor; each restricts it only to exceptional cases. As well, under Hanafi rules, the 
creditor is enforcing against the paymaster the debtor’s debt owed to the creditor. On the 
other hand, under Maliki rules, the creditor is enforcing against the paymaster the 
paymaster’s debt against the debtor. Accordingly, under Hanafi law, when sued by the 
creditor, the paymaster may raise the debtor’s, but not his own, defences. Conversely, 
under Maliki rules, the paymaster may raise against the creditor his (but not the debtor’s) 
defences.195
 
 The picture gets more complex but the analysis does not materially change where 
the creditor seeks a direct cause of action against the paymaster’s correspondent located 
in the creditor’s place. In such a case, two successive hawales are required. Under a first 
hawale, the paymaster becomes liable to pay the creditor; this agreement is to be 
followed by a second hawale, under which the paymaster’s correspondent becomes liable 
to pay the creditor.196 Following the previous discussion, under non-Hanafi law, parties 
                                                 
192 See text & notes 134-146, above.  
 
193 See discussion in text around notes 150-156, above. 
  
194 Of course, this could work only with the schools that recognize the possibility of an 
implicit contract, which excludes Shafi’i law which (as indicated in text & note 131, 
above) requires mutual assent to be orally expressed in clearly spoken words. 
 
195 In a suftaj, the paymaster owes the debtor. As well, neither personal nor proprietary 
securities are involved. Hence, per discussion at the end of §2.2 above, these issues, on 
which the Islamic schools vary, do not arise.  
 
196 In fact, such a second hawale will be required also to benefit the payee where he is the 
remitter himself.  
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to the first hawale agreement are the debtor and the creditor, and parties to the second 
hawale agreement are the paymaster (who replaces the debtor) and the creditor. Under 
Hanafi law, parties to the first hawale are the paymaster and creditor, while parties to the 
second hawale are the correspondent (who replaces the paymaster) and the creditor. 
 
This ‘chain transaction’ facilitating the creditor’s cause of action against the 
correspondent works as follows. Under non Hanafi law, the first hawale is established by 
the creditor’s acceptance from the debtor of the suftaj document containing the 
paymaster’s engagement. This creates the paymaster’s obligation to the creditor. The 
second hawale, generating the correspondent’s obligation to the creditor, is formed by the 
paymaster’s transmittal of advice to the creditor. This paymaster’s advice may be 
constituted through the same delivery by the debtor to the creditor of the suftaj containing 
the paymaster’s direction to the correspondent to pay the creditor; that is, in authorizing 
the debtor to send the suftaj to the creditor, the paymaster may be seen as authorizing the 
debtor to convey to the creditor the paymaster’s agreement with the creditor. Under non-
Hanafi rules, this paymaster’s agreement is not needed to support the paymaster’s own 
liability to the creditor; the agreement is however essential to make the correspondent, 
who is indebted to the paymaster, liable to the creditor instead.197 Effectively then, in 
delivering to the creditor a suftaj document containing both the paymaster’s undertaking 
and direction to the correspondent, the debtor acts both as a principal (under the first 
hawale) and agent for the paymaster (under the second hawale). The ensuing presentation 
of the suftaj by the creditor to the correspondent serves then as a demand for payment 
rather than a request designed to procure a binding agreement. 
  
In Hanafi law, the first hawale, leading to the paymaster’s engagement to the 
creditor, is formed by the paymaster’s agreement with the creditor. This agreement is 
created by the acceptance by the creditor of either the transmittal of confirmation from 
the paymaster to the creditor, or an authorized undertaking on the paymaster’s behalf by 
the correspondent. As was indicated, arguably, the transmittal to the creditor of the suftaj 
document with the consent of the paymaster may be viewed as a confirmation to the 
creditor of the paymaster’s undertaking and hence constitutes his agreement with the 
creditor.198 In turn, the second hawale, generating the correspondent’s engagement to the 
creditor, is established under Hanafi law by the correspondent’s agreement with the 
creditor. In practice, the creditor (or his agent) may procure the agreement of the 
paymaster and/or his correspondent upon presenting the suftaj document to the party to 
be charged with liability.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
197 Of course, similarly to the case discussed in text & note 194 above, this could work 
only with the schools that recognize the possibility of an implicit contract, which 
excludes Shafi’i law which requires mutual assent to be orally expressed in clearly 
spoken words. 
 
198 See text & note 194, above.  
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In the case of default by the correspondent, both major schools, the Hanafi and 
Maliki, usually do not permit the recourse by the creditor against the debtor or the 
paymaster;199 each restricts it only to exceptional cases. As well, under Hanafi rules, the 
creditor is enforcing against the correspondent the paymaster’s debt owed to the creditor; 
as discussed, under Hanafi rules, this is in fact the debtor’s debt owed to the creditor. On 
the other hand, under Maliki rules, the creditor is enforcing against the correspondent the 
correspondent’s debt owed to the paymaster. Accordingly, under Hanafi law, when sued 
by the creditor, the correspondent may raise the debtor’s, but not his own, defences. 
Conversely, under Maliki rules, the correspondent may raise against the creditor his (but 
neither the debtor’s nor the paymaster’s) defences.200
 
Certainly, the operation of the suftaj appears to be smoother under the non-Hanafi 
rules, which do not require the correspondent’s consent; furthermore, under non-Hanafi 
law, the paymaster is liable to the creditor without a separate engagement on his part, 
other than the original one to the debtor. And yet, under the non-Hanafi rules, for the 
paymaster and the correspondent to be liable to the creditor (respectively under the first 
and second hawales), the paymaster must have owed to the debtor (for the first hawale to 
be effective), and the correspondent must have owed to the paymaster (for the second 
hawale to be effective).201 The suftaj document sent by the debtor to the creditor usually 
attests to the paymaster’s engagement, and hence to the paymaster’s debt to the debtor. 
Conversely, that document, as well as any other communication that may be involved in 
the process, is unlikely to incorporate any indication, and certainly not one emanating 
from the correspondent, as to his liability, not to mention his indebtedness to the 
paymaster. Surely then, a creditor is likely to seek confirmation as to the correspondent’s 
liability; while, unlike under Hanafi law, a correspondent who is indebted to the 
paymaster is liable to the creditor even in the absence of a confirmation on his part, the 
creditor is unlikely to know on his own as to whether the correspondent is in fact 
indebted to the paymaster. Stated otherwise, in practice, the creditor is likely to seek the 
correspondent’s engagement not only under Hanafi law but also under non-Hanafi rules, 
except that under the latter, a correspondent indebted to the paymaster is liable to the 
creditor anyway, even without the knowledge of the creditor. 
   
Finally, as to the third question, relating to the non-transferability of the suftaj. It 
is universally agreed that suftajs are not transferred by the creditor,202 and certainly do 
                                                 
199 As discussed in §2.2 above, and notwithstanding Huvelin, Travaux, above note 5 at 24 
to the contrary, who (inexplicably in my view) learns of the creditor’s recourse against 
the paymaster (and quare if not also from the debtor) from the correspondent’s recourse 
against the paymaster.  
  
200 The differences among the various Islamic Schools are set out in §2.2 above and 
summarized at its end. See paragraph ending at note 195 above.   
 
201 For the non-Hanafi law requirement under which the hawale transferee (paymaster) is 
to owe money to the hawale transferor (debtor) see text that follows note 42, above. 
 
202 See text & note 114, above. 
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not circulate.203 It however seems that the reason is not doctrinal,204 but rather practical. 
Thus, the paymaster’s or correspondent’s engagement on a suftaj is to pay at the 
creditor’s place; it is however possible that in the course of the relevant period there was 
no commercial need for its use as a local payment mechanism, carrying out payment to a 
local creditor of the creditor, namely, for its circulation at the designated place of 
payment. At the same time, as indicated, even non-Hanafi rules do not facilitate the 
imposition on the paymaster or his correspondent of a duty to pay other than at the agreed 
place of payment;205 a suftaj could thus not be transferred with the view of  carrying out 
payment from the creditor to his own creditor at another place. Indeed, upon receiving 
instructions from a creditor who declined to be paid in money, there is nothing to 
preclude a paymaster or his correspondent from issuing his own suftaj payable to the 
creditor’s creditor at a place other than that of the creditor; this however effectuates a 
new suftaj, payable at the place of the creditor’s creditor. Where it was available,206 such 
a new suftaj may have been drawn on a correspondent of the issuer at the latter place, and 
in any event, cannot be conceptualized as the transfer of the original suftaj.   
 
§3.4 The objections to the suftaj 
 
 As was discussed, as a matter of the application of hawale principles, the suftaj 
can be effectuated by all schools; and yet, it has not fared well in Islamic law. Doctrine 
considers it abomination founded on a loan conferring profit on the lender. Profit is in the 
form of “exempt[ing] the lender from the danger of the road”, that is, the avoidance of the 
risk, and in fact the cost, of physical transport of money from place to place,207 in 
violation of the Koranic prohibition against “acquiring profit upon a loan.”208 It is 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
203 Notwithstanding Huvelin, Travaux, above note 5 at 24, who must be taken to refer to 
the transferability and circulation of the suftaj as a matter of strict legal doctrine rather 
than practice.  
 
204 For transferability and circulation of Islamic payment instruments as a matter of legal 
doctrine, see §3.1, above. 
 
205 See text around note 151, above. 
  
206 Which was not always the case; thus, a creditor in one city who received a suftaj 
payable in another city had to make his arrangements for the delivery of money between 
the two cities; in the absence of correspondent arrangements between the two cities 
transportation had to be physically made. See the example given by Goitein, above note 
104 at 245 n. 86. 
 
207 In this context, however, attention has not been paid to the commission or fee paid out 
by the debtor to the paymaster for the issue of the suftaj and hence arguably, to cover the 
cost of the physical transport from place to place. For the debtor’s commission see text & 
note 168 above.  
 
208 The Hedya, above note 28 at 333-334. 
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stressed that this prohibition applies “where a person gives something by way of loan”; 
the prohibition does not apply where instead, a person gives something by way of 
“deposit, to a merchant, in order that he may forward it to his friend at a distance”.209  At 
the same time, has not been sought to redefine the delivery of the money to the 
paymaster-merchant as a deposit and not a loan.210  An agreement to pay other than in the 
place of the transaction is approved in connection with the sale of goods but not 
otherwise.211   
 
Thus, being characterized as a loan, as a matter of strict doctrine, the suftaj is 
disapproved, though not forbidden, under the Hanafi law, and is virtually forbidden 
altogether under all other three schools. Maliki law permits it only in the case of extreme 
necessity; on their part, Shafi’i and Hanbali laws go only as far as to give a legal effect to 
the engagement of the paymaster-‘borrower’ where it is voluntarily assumed and not on 
the basis of his agreement with the debtor-‘lender.’212  
 
Ultimately however, major schools may have converged: Maliki lawyers have 
come to recognize the validity of the suftaj on the basis of ‘necessity’ and Hanafi doctrine 
has come to adhere to the fiction of a voluntary undertaking by the paymaster-borrower; 
that is, Hanafi law effectively forbids to lend on the explicit condition of repayment 
elsewhere, but not to borrow and undertake repayment elsewhere.213  Another version of 
the ‘rapproachment’ is that some Maliki scholars have been prepared to recognize a 
general danger in transit, and not merely a specific danger on the road to a given 
merchant, as permissible grounds for the use of the suftaj instead of the physical transport 
of money along that route. On their part, Hanafi scholars have come to embrace the suftaj 
as long as the repayment obligation elsewhere is implicit and yet non-obvious. Finally, 
even Shaifi’i rules have come to allow the use of the suftaj where it is in conformity with 
a local usage.214




210 Grasshoff, above note 175 at 22 cites a source rationalizing the ‘loan’ (as opposed to 
the ‘deposit’) conceptualization on the basis of repayment of an equivalent sum as 
opposed to the same coins originally delivered. 
 
211 Santillana, above note 136, note on Article 1964 at 689-691. 
 
212 Ray, above note 34 at 64-65. 
 
213 Santillana, above note 136, note on Article 1964 at 689-691. 
 
214 See Ashtor, above note 102 at 568-569. The two versions are not identical: ‘necessity’ 
under Santillana, ibid. is not the same as ‘general danger’ according to Ashtor (for the 
Maliki school) and unlike Ashtor, Santillana does not preclude an explicit condition of 
repayment elsewhere, as long as it appears to emanate exclusively from the paymaster-




Wherever the use of a suftaj was unlawful, undesirable or unavailable,215 payment 
to a distant place ought to be made in specie, namely, by the physical transport and 
delivery of money.216 In such a case, the debtor bears the risk of loss in transit, unless of 
course he delivers the money in his own place to the creditor’s agent. As well, at least in 
theory, payment to a distant place could be carried out in two other ways. First, it could 
be made by means of a hawale on an obligation that happened to be payable at the 
desired place. Second, possibly, one obligated on an existing debt to the debtor, may be 
persuaded to agree to pay at a place (and possibly to a party) other than the original. 
However, I suspect that other than in connection with the obligation to pay the price of 
goods sold,217 both these methods, particularly the latter, may be perceived as conferring 
on the debtor “profit upon a loan” and thus unlawful, not less than the suftaj.218    
 
What however remains enigmatic is the geographic distribution of suftaj 
operations in the Medieval Islamic Near East. As recalled, while Hanafi law prevailed in 
Iraq and Syria, Maliki rules prevailed in North Africa, both in Egypt, and throughout the 
Maghreb, to the west of it. Indeed, the thesis under which Hanafi commercial law better 
reflected actual practice219 does not seem to apply to Islamic payment instruments;220 as 
indicated,221 Maliki rules, which prevailed in Egypt,  had an edge in facilitating the 
operation of the hawale in connection with the suftaj as well as the other instruments. At 
the same time, while compared to Hanafi law, Maliki rules facilitated the operation of the 
suftaj with greater ease, they were stricter as to the unlawfulness of the arrangement. 
                                                 
215 According to Goitein, above note 104 at 243 suftajs “were not always easy to come 
by”. He associates it with the fact (alluded to at the beginning of §3.3, above) that “they 
were issued by and drawn upon well-known bankers or representatives of merchants, a 
fee was charged for their issue, and after presentation a daily penalty had to be paid for 
any delay in payment.” Ibid.   
  
216 One specific practice for making cash payments to distant places was that of 
dispatching money in sealed purses. See e.g. Goitein, ibid. at 240. See also at 245 where 
he speaks of the “circulation of purses” as being an alternative for the “remittance by 
suftajas.” 
 
217 See text & note 211, above. 
 
218 See text around notes 207-209, above. 
 
219 See AL Udovitch, “The ‘Law Merchant’ of the Medieval Islamic World”, in GE von 
Grunebaum, Logic in Classical Islamic Culture (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1970), at 
113. He restates the same view in e.g.  Udovitch Theory, above note 174 at 290.  The 
view is however stated to particularly apply to commercial associations.  
 
220 This critique is in the footsteps of Ray, above note 34 at 79-80. 
 
221  See §3.3, particularly text around note 201, above.  
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Thus, availability of the suftaj in Iraq may be explained by the relative leniency of Hanafi 
rules with regard to the unlawfulness of the arrangement; by the same token, 
unavailability in the North African Maghreb may be attributed to the greater strictness of 
Maliki law with regard to that point.222 On the other hand, abundance in Egypt, whether 
for payments going to or coming from the East, and particularly, for domestic payments, 
may be explained by the greater ease in which the suftaj could be facilitated under the 
Maliki law. 
 
This however does not explain the different situation in Egypt compared to that in 
the Maghreb; that is, it is hard to see why illegality considerations prevailed in the 
Maghreb, while operational advantages tipped the balance in Egypt. Nor does 
convergence of rules explain availability of the suftaj in Egypt and its unavailability in 
the Maghreb. Hence, one may speculate that it is not legal reasons, but rather, business 
and practical considerations, which determined the result in each location. For example, it 
may well be the case that adequate networks of paymasters and their correspondents 
existed both inside Egypt and throughout the area between Egypt and Iraq, but not over 
the Sahara, namely, between Egypt and the Maghreb.223  
 
4. Conclusion: hawale, suftaj and the bill of exchange 
 
 In his monumental work on the history of English law, Holdsworth is skeptical as 
to whether the modern bill of exchange is a true derivation from the business practices of 
the Arabs.  He nevertheless speaks of the Arabs using “something very much like the 
modern bill of exchange” that as early as the eighth century CE: 
 
[C]ould pass from hand to hand by something very much like an indorsement; 
and, to use modern terms, the payee [thereof] had a right of recourse against the 
drawer in the event of non-payment by the acceptor.224
 
The present study does not support this specific observation. First, eighth century 
may be too early a milestone, at least for a solid record of Medieval Islamic payment 
instruments.225 Second, there is no indication that at any time Medieval Islamic payment 
                                                 
222 This indeed appears to be the explanation of Ashtor, above note 102 at 568-569 (in 
conjunction with 567).  
 
223 To that end, see e.g. Goitein, above note 104 at 244-245.  
 
224 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law Vol. VIII (London: Methuen, Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1922) at 133, whose observation to that effect is the starting point of JM 
Holden, The History of Negotiable Instruments in English Law (London: University of 
London The Athlone Press, 1955, rep. 1993, WM. W. Gaunt & Sons) at 1. Holdsworth is 
explicitly relying on Huvelin, Travaux, above note 5. 
 
225 Huvelin, ibid. at 24 vaguely points to the 8th century CE as the starting point for the 
financial system that gave rise tothe Islamic payment instruments. In fact, the earliest 
documented sakk, operating as a hawale, may go back to late seventh century CE. See FD 
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instruments were endorsable, that is, that their transfer was accomplished by the delivery 
plus the endorsement signature by the transferor of the instrument.226 Third, in the case of 
default by the paymaster (corresponding to the drawer), both Hanafi and Maliki rules 
permit recourse by the creditor-payee against the paymaster-drawer (as well as against 
the debtor-remitter) only under narrow circumstances.227
 
Furthermore, even some premises underlying Holdsworth’s observation may 
appear to be exaggerated.  
 
To begin with, already before the advent of Islamic law, both the circulation of 
credit228 and the non-cash payment between distant parties229 had been available under 
Roman law by means of a series of either delegations or cessions. As already 
indicated,230 the hawale operates in a similar manner to that of the Roman delegation 
                                                                                                                                                 
Chester, “On early Moslem promissory notes” (1896), 16 Journal of American Oriental 
Society, 43 as analyzed by Ray, above note 34 at 67. However, Ashtor, above note 102 at 
558 speaks of the suftaj as going back to “the ninth century.” Extensive use nevertheless 
dates from a later period. See the beginning of §3.1, above.   
 
226 But cf. Ashtor, ibid. at 564 who maintains that “the Arabs had been using 
endorsements since the days of the caliphs as can be deduced from tenth century texts.” 
Huvelin ibid, at 24 speaks of endorsing a suftaj in the sense of transferring the debt 
obligation on it by means of a hawale. Even Ashtor, ibid. at 570 appears to use 
“endorsee” in the sense of “transferee”, hence, not in its technical and usual sense.  For 
the suftaj as transferable in theory but not in practice, see text around notes 202-206, 
above, and for the Islamic payment instruments as non-endorseable, see text & note 128, 
above. 
 
227 See text around notes 44-53. The point is conceded by Huvelin, ibid. at 23, who, as 
already indicated in text around notes 174 – 176 nevertheless goes on to argue (at 24) that 
recourse is available to the creditor. As indicated, his position on the point appears to be 
erroneous. See text that precedes paragraph containing note 186 above. 
 
228 Credit can be circulated where the delegate, having become entitled to receive payment 
from the paymaster, re-delegates the paymaster to make payment to the delegatee’s own 
creditor. See K. Verboven, “Faeneratores, Negotiatores and Financial Intermediation in 
the Roman World (late Republic and early Empire)” in K. Verboven, K. Vandorpe, and 
V. Chankowski, (ed.), Pistoi Dia Tèn Technèn -Banks, Loans and Financial Archives in 
the Ancient World: Studies in Honour of Raymond Bogaert (Leuven: Peeters, 2008) at 
227, touches upon the service of arranging delegationes to transfer existing debts from 
one person to another. 
 
229 For intercity non-cash payments in Ancient Rome see e.g. G. Platon, Les Banquiers 
dans la législation de Justinien (Premiére Partie) (Paris: Librairie Recueil Sirey, 1912),  
at 108-109.  
 
230 See text around notes 62-65, above. 
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under Hanafi rules, and like a cession under the Maliki school. From that perspective, 
Islamic law did not move legal doctrine any further than Roman law had already done. 
Moreover, by way of a setback from Roman law, Islamic law does not facilitate the 
accrual in the hands of a creditor of an ‘abstract’ right, namely an entitlement from the 
paymaster (or his correspondent) to the sum of the money to which the obligation relates, 
free of defences available to the parties in their bilateral relationships.231  
 
Holdsworth’s observation appears to be exaggerated also in another respect. 
Transferability of a debt in association with the physical transfer of the debt instrument is 
not an Islamic innovation. Thus, as was already indicated, a bearer clause binding a 
paymaster to pay the presenter of the document containing that clause had been effective 
in the ancient Near East, that is, in Mesopotamia, both in the Old Babylonian Period 
(2000-1600 BCE), and during the Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian Kingdoms (745-
539 BCE), way back before the advent of Islam.232 As well, in Mesopotamia, during the 
Old Babylonian Period (2000-1600 BCE), there is evidence to the transferability of loan 
documents from the hands of one creditor to those another, 233 albeit in a procedure 
whose both practice and legal underpinning are not entirely clear. Furthermore, the 
transferability by delivery of a loan document payable by the borrower to his lender 
almost234 as if it were an ordinary chattel,235 goes back to the Jewish Talmud, where it is 
extensively discussed,236 and thus preceded Islam.237  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
231 For this result in Roman law under the absolute (or pure) delegation see Maxwell, 
above note 65 at 95-105.  
 
232 See paragraph concluding with note 125, above. 
 
233 See e.g. M. Van de Mieroop Society and Enterprise in Old Babylonian Ur (Berlin: 
Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 1992) at 207 and M. Van de Mieroop, “Credit as a Facilitator of 
Exchange in Old Babylonian Mesopotamia” in M. Hudson and M. Van de Mieroop 
(eds.), Debt and Economic Renewal in the Ancient Near East (Bethesda, Md.: CDL, 
2002) at 163, 166. The Old Babylonian Period (2000-1600 BCE) included the reign of 
Hammurabi (1792-1750 BCE). 
 
234 The qualification is designed to point out that while mesira (delivery) is available for 
the transfer of a loan document, not all methods for transferring a chattel, such as 
hagbaha (lifting) and meshicha (drawing near or pulling), as well as chalifin  (barter, 
namely, the exchange of two chattels) are available for acquiring ownership in a loan 
document. For such modes of acquisition for chattels in general, see Talmud Bavli, 
Kiddushin at 25B (as well as 22B) and Bava Batra at 84B, as well as Bava Metzia at 46A. 
For the inadequacy of meshicha (drawing near or pulling) (and hence the need for 
physical delivery by the transferor, i.e. mesira) see e.g. Talmud Bavli, Bava Batra at 
76A, commentary by both  Rashi D”H “Ve-otiyot bimsira”, and Tosafot, D”H “Iy”. For 
the inadequacy of chalifin for the acquisition of a documentary note of indebtedness on a 





In any event, even assuming similarity between the suftaj and the bill of 
exchange, and recognizing that Continental Europe may have been familiar with the 
suftaj,238 one may share Holdsworth’s skepticism as to actual parenthood; the latter 
cannot be asserted with certainty. As Udovitch stated in another context:239
 
Determining cultural and institutional influences between civilizations and 
peoples is a complex and elusive undertaking. In the absence of clear and decisive 
evidence it is difficult to decide whether similar ideas and techniques are the 
result of direct transmission from one group to another or are independent 
responses to similar challenges. 
 
And yet, we are not precluded from observing the evolution of human thought 
from one civilization to another, even without being able to factually determine 
parenthood for concepts and institutions. To that end, one may take note of the fact that 
unlike under any earlier legal doctrine or institution, under Maliki law, the hawale 
heralds the negotiable instrument in two ways.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
235 This is so even though it is recognized that unlike an ordinary chattel the loan 
document has no intrinsic value. See e.g. Talmud Bavli, Bava Kamma, at 62B (dealing 
with a thief’s exemption to pay the double payment for which a thief of an ordinary 
chattel is liable) and 98A (dealing with loss incurred when a loan document is burnt). 
Lack of intrinsic value in a loan document is also alluded to e.g. in Talmud Bavli, 
Kiddushin at 9A, 26A and 48A. 
 
236 See text around notes 240-245 below. In contrast, in the Ancient Near East, an 
acknowledgment of debt document was transferable only subject to the debtor’s consent. 
See Bogaert, Les Origines above note 8 at 123-124. 
 
237 The Talmudic era is said to come to its end in 500 CE, a year that marks the final 
reduction of the Talmud Bavli (that is, Babylonian Talmud).  See e.g. A. Steinsaltz, The 
Talmud-The Steinsaltz Edition - A Reference Guide (New York: Random House, 1989) at 
2 and 32. This preceded the advent of Islam in the seventh century. The Talmud is written 
in Hebrew and Aramaic. 
 
238 Both aspects are discussed by Ashtor, above note 102, respectively at 562-565 
(focusing on distinctions) and 570-572 (focusing on Venice’s trade in the Near East at the 
time of the Crusaders). Familiarity with the suftaj may have been the result of trade 
relations between the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean for which see e.g. EH Byrne, 
“Commercial Contracts of the Genoese in the Syrian Trade of the Twelfth Century” 
(1916), 31 Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 at 157; and AE Sayous, “Le commerce de 
Marseille avec la Syrie au milieu du XIII siècle” (1929), 95 Revue des ètudes historiques 
391. 
 
239 Udovitch, Commenda, above note 172 at 207. 
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First, in providing a legal framework facilitating the transferability (though not 
full negotiability) of the ruq’a and sakk payable to bearer, the hawale under Maliki rules 
goes beyond the mere recognition of instruments payable to bearer in the Ancient Near 
East. Moreover, Maliki rules do not distinguish between the transferability of instruments 
payable to the bearer and instruments payable to a named payee; effectively, both are 
transferable by delivery. In sum, Maliki law thus provides for solid rules to govern a 
simplified procedure for the transfer by delivery of informal debt instruments. In contrast, 
under the Talmud, to be transferable, a documentary note of indebtedness may have to 
comply with formality requirements,240 even if only as to adequate witnessing.241 
Furthermore, the Rabbis disagreed as to whether by itself, the delivery of the 
documentary note of indebtedness is adequate to transfer the right to collect the debt,242 
or whether, to that end, an accompanying properly-executed bill of sale is also required 
from the transferor-lender.243 In the footsteps of the transferable debt document, such a 
                                                 
240 Formal debt documents may go back to the Greek chirograph and syngraph mentioned 
in note 117; however they were not transferable. Under the Talmud, a formal legal 
document, or deed, is called shetar. “Every shetar, as a formal document, requires the 
signatures of witnesses”. Otherwise, an informal unwitnessed document is a mere piece 
of evidence for an oral contract. See AM Fuss, “Shetar”, in M. Elon (ed.) The Principles 
of Jewish Law (Jerusalem: Keter, 1975) (Reprinted from Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1st ed), 
Columns 183-190 at 184. But according to the Rambam (Maimonides who lived between 
1135 and 1204), for a documentary note of indebtedness on a loan (shetar hov) manually 
written by the debtor there are no formal requirements other than as witnessing. See 
Rambam, Mishpatim: Hilchot Malveh ve-Loveh, Section 11, Rule 2, as well as Section 27 
Rule 1. The Rambam’s work is in Hebrew.  
 
241 The Talmud records a disputation as to whether a documentary note of indebtedness 
(Shtar Hov) has to meet witnessing requirements. See Talmud Bavli, Gitin at 86B. 
Maimonides upholds witnessing requirements with respect to either the signature of the 
debtor or the delivery by him of the document to the creditor. See Rambam, ibid. Section 
11 Rules 2 and 3. According to the Magid Mishna commentary to the Rambam, ibid., this 
reflects the majority view among the post-Talmud Rabbis. Delivery witnesses as a 
replacement for signature witnesses are discussed e.g. by Rashi, Talmud Bavli, Bava 
Batra at 176 D”H “Vegoveh”. Witnessing requirements are also discussed in Choshen 
Mishpat Sections 40 and 51 in both Tur (Rabbi Jacob ben Asher: 1270-1343) and 
Shulchan Aruch (Rabbi Josef Karo: 1488-1575). Both sources are in Hebrew. 
 
242 Those satisfied with the power of the mere delivery of the document to transfer the 
right to collect the debt nevertheless disagreed as to whether a transferee or in fact any 
person in possession of a documentary note of indebtedness payable to another person is 
required to prove title (namely receipt by way of transfer or by way of gift from the 
named payee or someone deriving title from him) or suffice it for him to rely on his 
possession. See Talmud Bavli, Bava Batra, at 173A. 
 
243 See Talmud Bavli, Kiddushin at 47B-48A where it is further disputed as to whether to 
effect a transfer the bill of sale (if needed) is required to contain prescribed language as 
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bill of sale may have to comply with formality requirements, even if only as to 
witnessing.244 Indeed, it is undisputed that in conjunction with the physical delivery245 of 
the debt instrument, the Talmudic sages uphold the transferability of the right to collect 
on it; nevertheless, ironically, in thriving to provide for clear and certain rules, and yet in 
disagreeing on what they are, the Talmudic sages increased uncertainty. Thus, taking into 
account the requirements and disputations just discussed, compared to Maliki law, the 
applicable legal framework under the Talmud is less certain and possibly more 
cumbersome. In the final analysis, one cannot fail to note the contribution of Maliki rules 
to the facilitation of the transferability by the simple delivery of an informal debt 
instrument.  
 
Second, without formally invoking cession, and though by itself (at least in 
practice) non-transferable, the suftaj accords to the creditor a direct entitlement against 
the paymaster as well as his correspondent. Under Maliki rules, the creditor’s entitlement 
to enforce the obligation of the paymaster is on the paymaster’s obligation to the debtor; 
the creditor’s entitlement to enforce the obligation of the correspondent is on the 
correspondent’s debt due to the paymaster. Either way, the creditor’s entitlement does not 
require a reaffirmation or a renewed obligation to be undertaken by the party liable.  
Rather,246 the accrual in the creditor’s hands of an entitlement towards first the paymaster 
and second the correspondent is on the basis of the transfer of the suftaj document by the 
debtor to the creditor. Compared to the Talmud, entitlement against the correspondent is 
certainly a Maliki innovation;247 since the correspondent’s undertaking is not recorded on 
                                                                                                                                                 
well as to whether the transfer of the right to collect on a documentary loan forfeits 
altogether the power of the lender to release the borrower. See also Talmud Bavli, Bava 
Batra, 75B-77B (with Tosafot at 77A D”H “Amar Ameimar”), Talmud Bavli, Sanhedrin 
at 31A, and Talmud Bavli, Yevamot at 115B. On the post transfer release by the lender 
see also Talmud Bavli, Bava Metzia 20A and Ketuvot 85B-86A.  For a summary that 
appears to support a bill of sale requirement for the transferability of the documentary 
note of indebtedness see Choshen Mishpat above note 241 Section 66. See in general, 
AM Futh, “Assignability of Debt and Negotiable Instruments in Jewish Law” (1984-85), 
12 Diné Israel 19.  
 
244 Being a legal document, the bill of sale is a shetar (for this term see note 240 above); 
as such it is subject to the same requirements and disputations as the documentary note of 
indebtedness.  
 
245 Even commentators who are satisfied with ‘constructive delivery’ for ordinary chattels 
(e.g. Tosafot, D”H “Behema” commenting on Talmud Bavli, Kiddushin at 25B) insist on 
the physical (or actual) delivery (from hand to hand) for a documentary note (e.g. 
Tosafot, D”H “Iy” commenting on Talmud Bavli, Bava Batra at 76A).   
 
246 See text around note 197, above.  
 
247 For the Maliki innovation with respect to the creditor’s entitlement towards the 
paymaster, see discussion in the immediately preceding paragraph.  
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the suftaj document as issued by the paymaster to the debtor and sent to the creditor,248 
no such entitlement can be made available to the creditor under the Talmud.249     
 
While the transferability by delivery feature is the forerunner of negotiation, the 
direct entitlement feature is the precursor of the acceptor’s liability to the payee on a bill 
of exchange. Indeed, Islamic law and practice ended up arresting the development of 
their own innovation; Islamic practice did not encourage the circulation of the suftaj, and 
Islamic doctrine was hostile to the paymaster’s obligation on the suftaj. In the final 
analysis, however, fundamental elements of the bill of exchange, both as a negotiable 
instrument and machinery for the transfer of funds, are traceable to Islamic instruments 
and legal doctrine. True, Roman law had facilitated the circulation of credit in the form of 
a series of re-delegations or re-assignments; in turn, Jewish law had sown the seeds of 
transferability by delivery of debt instruments. Early Medieval Islamic law, particularly 
Maliki rules in Egypt, combined and enhanced both achievements. By giving effect to a 
mere delivery accompanied by an informal agreement, these rules provide for a simple 
mechanism to accomplish the circulation of informal instruments of credit. Each such 
instrument contains the explicit undertaking of a paymaster, and as applicable, the 
implicit liability of his correspondent. Improvements, particularly in the form of full 
negotiability for the instrument and party’s liability on an absolute abstract obligation to 
pay a sum of money were to come later and elsewhere.  
  
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
 
                                                 
248 See text around note 197, above. 
 
249 Certainly, under the Talmud, liability on a documentary note of indebtedness, whether 
to the original creditor or his transferee, is on the basis of the undertaking on the note. For 
post-Talmudic adaptation to Islamic legal environment on the point per Gaonic Response 
No. 423, reproduced in A. A. Harkavy (ed.) Gaonic Reponsa (NY: Menora, 1959) 
[recorded in the original Judeo-Arabic and Hebrew translation], see G. Libson, Jewish 
and Islamic Law: A Comparative Study of Custom During Geonic Period (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003) at 96-97 & notes 26-33. The Gaonim, or 
‘excellencies’, were post-Talmudic sages and scholarly leaders, first in Babylonia and 
then beyond,  in a period that extended approximately from the 7th to around the middle 
of the 13th century CE, prior to the ascent of European Jewry. More information can be 
found online:  <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9036016?query=gaon&ct=>. 
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